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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this work is to provide a conceptual framework applicable to most decisionmaking systems and to propose set of propositions drawing together work from diverse fields concerned with political behavior. In the first chapter, key concepts are distinguished and the literature bearing on the relationships among those concepts are reviewed. In the second chapter, pilot data collected from four colleges are summarized. These pilot data serve to sharpen the relationships suggested in Chapter I and to add several new concepts. In the third chapter, the relationships discussed are formalized into a set of propositions. The final chapter suggests the utility of this work for future research, policy analysis, and theory development. (Author)

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# *A Conceptual Framework for Effective Decisionmaking in Colleges*

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# THE COMPOUND SYSTEM

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Effective Decisionmaking in Colleges*

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1973

*Dedicated to*  
STEWART EDELSTEIN,  
Political Artisan

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## *Foreword*

If there is a weakness in the efforts of those who study higher education, it is probably their inability or unwillingness to work on the development of an indigenous and grounded theory that would help to explain how higher education operates. Without some broader context of interpretation that grounded theory provides, data is simply a collection of numbers with which people play political games.

There are some renegades from other theoretical camps who have applied their particular theoretical perspective to higher education: there are management theorists who apply Likert, Bennis, Argyris, and Thompson to colleges and universities, there are "production" theorists who see higher education as an assembly line, there are political science theorists who talk about the community power structure of higher education, etc. But in every case, it is a single, borrowed theory, applied whole to a field it was not intended for in the first place.

This work represents a courageous attempt to develop, in an eclectic way, a number of theoretical perspectives on higher education which are grounded in the realities of institutional life. The concepts are immediately put to work in the series of case studies, which (unlike most case studies) are used as a proving ground for the theoretical notions developed in the book.

The effort is far from perfect as a comprehensive theory of higher education, a statement with which Dr. Helsabeck would, I am



sure, agree. But it is a significant point of embarkation—a beginning. This is not Grand Theory in the Parsonian sense, but rather the kind of theory proposed by Glaser and Strauss: immediately useful in establishing research designs, helpful in itself as an explanation of what is happening in colleges and universities, provocative in establishing many new ways of viewing old problems.

I would hope that this is only the first such contribution we can expect from Dr. Helsaheck. Both researchers and practitioners can profit from his work.

*Harold Hodgkinson*

## *Preface*

Anyone who has attempted to understand decisionmaking and its impact on organizational effectiveness certainly must appreciate the need for a better sharing of the insights of theoretical researchers and practicing decisionmakers.

Frequently one hears the assertion that practice can benefit greatly from theoretical research. Rarely does one hear the complementary assertion that theoretical research can benefit greatly from insights derived from practice. Theoretical researchers of course recognize the need for data "from the field," but they often depreciate the knowledge of the practitioner. As many have found, the gains to both theory building and policymaking through an exchange of insights are appreciable. This work is an attempt to demonstrate the contributions of both theoretical research and practitioner insights to the understanding of institutional decisionmaking, and is addressed principally to students of higher education and researchers of organizational behavior.

This monograph represents a serious reconsideration of the conceptual framework and data drawn from my dissertation. Having worked primarily in the domain of theoretical sociology, I found that I had tended to overlook some of the complexities in college and university governance that have long been understood by policy researchers and practitioners in higher education. This past year at the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at the

University of California, Berkeley, has helped balance my perspective—a balance which is hopefully evident in this work.

My indebtedness in this work begins in a direct way at Indiana University, in my study with Vincent Ostrom in political science, who altered the conceptual lens I used in viewing organizations. Many of his insights have become so internal to my own thinking that I can no longer define my indebtedness to him. He serves as an intellectual model as well as a provider of ideas.

In sociology, Marvin Olsen, Sheldon Stryker, and Lawrence Hazelrigg were particularly helpful in their scrutiny of my doctoral work, thereby increasing my own critical abilities and sharpening the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this work.

I benefited in quite specific ways from the critical reading and helpful suggestions of my colleagues at the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education. Lyman Glenny, Harold Hodgkinson, James Kidder, and Richard Meisinger were particularly helpful in this respect.

I am especially appreciative to Lyman Glenny, director of the Center, for providing me with the resources and encouragement essential to the completion of this work. Harriet Renaud, the Center's chief editor, helped me become more aware of the standards of good clear thought, as well as the expression of it.

I thank Stockton State College for giving me a leave of absence to work at the Center, especially as the college had just completed its first full year of operation.

My colleague and friend, Stewart Edelstein, worked with me on the manuscript throughout this year, and were it not for his assistance this work would not yet be completed. He provided support when needed, insightful criticism throughout, and extraordinarily helpful suggestions for organization of the work.

To my wife and children go appreciation for help in keeping this entire project in perspective.

*Robert E. Helsabeck*

*Berkeley, California  
June 1973*

## *Introduction*

As long as there have been students of political behavior, the study of arrangements of collective decisionmaking has been one of their central interests. Although most social scientists have been concerned primarily with collective decisionmaking as a factor dependent upon other conditions, recently students have demonstrated an interest in collective decisionmaking structures as independent variables affecting effectiveness. It is this emphasis upon decisionmaking arrangements as the independent variable and organizational effectiveness as the dependent variable which constitutes the conceptual and theoretical focus of this work.

A great deal of interest and concern regarding collective decisionmaking on college campuses has recently been manifested in studies dealing with university and college governance (AAHE, 1967; Baldridge, 1971; Hodgkinson, 1971; McConnell, 1971; McConnell and Mortimer, 1971; Shulman, 1970; and Wise, 1969). Some of these studies suggest, for example, that students of the 1960s turned to violence because they felt shut out of the decisionmaking process and were not involved in matters of institutional governance. Further, these studies have shown faculties to be highly alienated in some colleges and universities, a fact often explained in terms of their lack of involvement in institutional decisionmaking. In addition, the recent movement of faculties toward collective bargaining can be understood partially as an expression of their lack of confidence in the capability of the traditional decisionmaking processes to

serve faculty interests. These conditions indicate the practical relevance of investigating the decisionmaking process in American colleges.

In this context, questions arise at both theoretical and policy levels. The theoretical questions stem from political theory and community and organizational power studies, and the policy questions stem from the problems and dilemmas of governance practices described by those involved in college governance.

Some of the questions related to theory that arise are: What is the relationship between decisionmaking structure and organizational effectiveness? What is the relationship between subsystem autonomy and system viability? What different relationships are found when various indices of effectiveness are used? What are the relationships between these indices of effectiveness?

Questions related to policy are the practical ones that college administrators, faculties, and students are faced with, such as: Should they opt for a "separation of powers," with faculty, students and administrators having their own separate areas of decisionmaking, or should they reject separate senates and opt for a single community senate? How should the apparent growth of collective bargaining and its impact on internal decisionmaking be viewed by administrators? Should they continue the trend toward wider participation in decisionmaking, or should they follow Kingman Brewster's (1970) admonition to faculty, students, alumni, and trustees to operate under administrative "accountability" rather than through representation on the decisionmaking councils? What criteria should be used to evaluate a governance system, or to say that "it works"?

To approach either basic or policy research on these questions, one should construct or have at his disposal a well-developed conceptual framework for viewing the events related to decisionmaking within an organization. It also seems economical to make use of the learning from as broad a base of research as is available. Specifically, if one wants to understand the relationship between various decisionmaking structures and organizational effectiveness, he would profit from research done on community or national decisionmaking, as well as from sociological and political theory. With care, a great deal can be learned through analogy.

## ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

The purpose of this work is to provide the reader with a conceptual framework applicable to most decisionmaking systems and to propose a set of propositions drawing together work from diverse fields concerned with political behavior. In the first chapter, key concepts are distinguished and the literature bearing on the relationships among those concepts are reviewed. In the second chapter, pilot data collected from four colleges are summarized. (The complete case reports are contained in the Appendix.) These pilot data serve to sharpen the relationships suggested in Chapter I and to add several new concepts. In the third chapter, the relationships discussed are formalized into a set of propositions. The final chapter suggests the utility of this work for future research, policy analysis, and theory development.

# I.

## *Conceptual and Theoretical Background*

Much of the work done on decisionmaking structures in higher education seems to be guided solely by the concrete experiences of specific colleges and universities, and has taken insufficient note of the rich conceptual and theoretical work on decisionmaking found in the social sciences. This chapter is an attempt to select relevant insights from the social sciences and to draw these together into a useful framework for viewing decisionmaking and effectiveness in an academic setting.

A necessary beginning in the development of this framework is the definition of key analytic concepts: dimensions of decisionmaking structure and organizational effectiveness which can be identified and used by the researcher and theoretician in higher education. Indeed, a major weakness in the construction of analytic models for decisionmaking in colleges and universities has been the absence of such adequately developed concepts.

### DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURE

This concept is central to this work and requires definition as a whole as well as definition of its various dimensions. Decisionmaking structure is equivalent to the written and unwritten constitution, i.e., the formal and informal pattern of decisionmaking prerogatives of members of a political system.

Many studies of decisionmaking structure have concentrated on the amount of participation of members in group decisions as the only dimension of the decisionmaking structure. But amount of participation can be seen as only one dimension of the larger concept decisionmaking structure (membership decisionmaking prerogatives). This more inclusive concept can include consideration of the number and autonomy of decisionmaking groups (centricity) as well as amount of member participation in the system. In addition, what will be termed "decision-structure variance" and a "system of concurrent regimes" are included as equally important concepts for understanding the decisionmaking structure.

#### *Amount of Participation*

This concept refers to the degree of input by members of a unit. A highly participatory unit, whether it is a college as a whole (the system) or the students as a body (a subsystem or unit), is one in which a large proportion of the unit has an effect on collective decisions made by the group, and will be referred to as "democratic." The opposite situation will be called "oligarchic." The limits of this variable are one-man rule (monarchy) and everyman rule (mass democracy).

Amount of participation refers not only to the proportion of a group's membership involved in the decisionmaking process, but also to the extent to which this involvement can make a difference in decisions; merely going through the motions of making decisions should not be confused with real decisionmaking prerogative. For example, if a large proportion of the faculty participates in curricular decisions, but their decisions can be and are routinely vetoed by the president, that faculty is not really participating in the sense that the term is used here.\*

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\*Obviously participation in decisionmaking by a particular group is highest if that group *determines* the outcome of the decision, less, but still high if it has  *veto power* along with other groups, less if the group is only *consulted* about decisions, and still less if the group is only involved in *informal discussions* about the decision. If the group is *unaware* of the decisions being made, then there is, of course, no participation. (These degrees, used in a recent AAUP study of college and university governance (1971), give a sense of the range of this variable.)



### *Centricity (the Corporate and Federated Structures)*

This refers to the number of decisionmaking units and their decisionmaking prerogatives, i.e., the degree of their autonomy. The basic distinction involved here is between a corporate structure and a federated one.\* In a corporate structure, all decisions are made by a single decisionmaking body, whether that body is highly participatory or not. A college governed by an all-college council whose members, representing the faculty, the students, and the administrators, consult widely with their constituents, is therefore considered corporate, albeit highly participatory. The federated system, by contrast, is one in which units within the system (subsystems) have specified decisionmaking prerogatives that are relatively independent of other subsystems. For example, a student body may have unquestioned jurisdiction over the allocation of student activity fees, and a faculty unquestioned jurisdiction on curricular matters and the awarding of degrees, but with regard to public relations or the admission of students, faculty and students have virtually nothing to say—the latter two areas lying within the domain of the administration.

In short, a system can become more federated either by increasing the number of units with particular decisionmaking prerogatives or by increasing the autonomy of decisionmaking units without a change in number of units (given more than one unit in the system).

### *Concurrent Regimes*

A system in which the decisionmaking autonomy of a unit is increased by strong ties to outside agencies will be called "a system of concurrent regimes (Ostrom et al., 1961)." For example, a teaching faculty may be associated with the AAUP or a faculty union, from which the faculty can derive support sufficient to increase its autonomy within the college, or students may be associated with a

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\*This distinction is similar to Dahl's (1963) "unitary" and "pluralistic" systems. The terms corporate and federated are used here to tie this research into the complex organization literature in which these terms are employed. The extreme of the federated case, as the term is used here, is the "confederation," which denotes a minimum connection between units. In this study, this extreme will be labelled "highly federated."

statewide student organization and thereby derive some independence within the college that they otherwise would not have had.

#### *Decision-Structure Variance (the Simple and Compound Systems)*

To conceptualize the variations in decisionmaking structure, it is necessary to make distinctions between types of decisions. A basic distinction in the literature is between strategic (goal-setting and other long-term) decisions, and tactical (operational, everyday) decisions. Finer distinctions, however, are necessary. The types of decisions delineated in Table 1 are drawn from a recent AAUP study (1971), writings on political economics (Zald, 1970), and researcher-intuition.

Two separate distinctions are contained in the decisionmaking typology: type of decision and level of decisionmaking unit. The decision categories—authority allocation, resource allocation, resource acquisition\*, and production—can be applied to any level (location) of organizational activity under investigation—system level or subsystem. If it seems desirable, one can subdivide “subsystem” into several more concrete categories, such as division, department, program, etc. Therefore, the grid can contain 12 or 16 cells, instead of 8. (See Table 1)

A third dimension can be introduced into this decision-structure chart by describing the participation of the several constituencies participating in these various decisions. For example, the board of trustees, the president, one faculty member, and one student may make the decisions in a particular decision area (such as institutional building priorities). This information would be entered along with a description of other decisions in that particular decision type. The entire decision type, then, might be described as “corporate, oligarchic.” In this way, one can quite effectively represent the decision-making structure for an institution in question. It seems plausible to suggest that this typology, which will become clearer in the presentation of the pilot data, can be used for any complex organization, and is not limited to colleges.

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\*It should be noted here that resource acquisition decisions are being treated as a type of decision (an independent variable) and should not be confused with the outcome of these decisions, resource acquisition itself (a dependent variable).

TABLE 1. Decision Typology.

TYPE OF DECISION	LEVEL OF DECISION- MAKING	
	System	Sub- System
<i>Authority Allocation</i> These are constitutional decisions of a system or subsystem which bear on the question 'Who decides who decides?' They include both formal and informal allocations of authority.	I	V
<i>Resource Allocation</i> These decisions pertain to the distribution of resources within a system or subsystem. At the system level these decisions include institutional long-range and short-range budgeting, the ordering of building priorities, and personnel allocation. At the subsystem level these decisions include the assignment of faculty to college committees, classes, and departmental chairmanships; the assignment of staff and students to college committees; and the allocation of funds within subsystem units.	II	VI
<i>Resource Acquisition</i> These decisions pertain to the acquisition of resources by the system or subsystem. Resources are here broadly defined to include the acquisition of funds and equipment, recruitment and selection of students; and the acquisition, recruitment, selection, and retention of persons to conduct the affairs of the system or subsystem (faculty, staff, and administration).	III	VII
<i>Production</i> These decisions bear on the production of the particular product of the system or subsystem (e.g., the graduates). They include the manner of processing the material (the curriculum), the standards for acceptance of the finished product (degree requirements), and the limits of acceptability of the product (grounds for academic dismissal). At the subsystem level these are decisions relevant to specific activities, such as conducting classes, operating an administrative office, conducting research, and planning student activities.	IV	VIII

By using a set of data presented in the format of Table 1, one can construct graphs to demonstrate the decision-structure variance—the degree of difference between decisionmaking arrangements for the various decision types. One possible arrangement of decisionmaking for the various types of decisions is demonstrated in the following hypothetical example (Fig. 1):




FIGURE 1. Issue Types (I–VIII) Plotted by Amount of Participation and Degree of Centrality for a Hypothetical Compound System.

Type I (system-level authority allocation) and Type II (system resource allocation) decisions, made by the chief executive, might be described as “corporate, monarchic,” and are entered at the extreme lower left corner of the graph. Type III (institutional resource acquisition) decisions, made by a few top executives and by unit directors, are “moderately federated and oligarchic,” and hence fall near the center axis at “oligarchic.” Type IV (institution-level production) decisions, made by all members of an institution acting together, are “corporate and mass democratic,” and are placed in the upper left corner of the graph. Type V (unit-level authority allocation) decisions, made by unit directors, are “federated, monarchic.” Type VI (unit-level resource allocation) decisions, made by a few members within each appropriate unit, are “federated and oligarchic,” and fall at the moderately federated, oligarchic intersection. Type VII (unit-level resource acquisition) decisions, made by units as

a whole, are labelled "federated, democratic." Type VIII (unit-level production) decisions, made by all members of each appropriate unit, can be described as "federated and mass democratic," and thus fall in the upper right corner of the graph. This hypothetical system delineated in Figure 1 is an example of a *compound* system in that it evidences variations in decisionmaking arrangements. (Note this large area encompassed in the overall circle.)

In contrast, the following two graphs represent examples of *simple* systems (low decision-structure variance). In "A," the chief executive makes all the decisions; in "B," everyone contributes to all the decisions. In both cases, there is no variation in decisionmaking arrangements across types of decisions. (Note the small area encompassed in the overall circle, Fig. 2.)




FIGURE 2. Issue Types (I-III) Plotted by Amount of Participation and Degree of Centricity for Hypothetical Simple Systems.

In short, decision-structure variance refers to the variations of decisionmaking arrangements across types of decisions.

#### *Decision-Structure Clarity*

This concept refers to the accuracy of the members' perceptions of the decision-structure (Zald, 1970). The accuracy is determined by the degree of accord between the perceptions of members

of the system and those decisionmakers who are highly involved in the decisionmaking. Decision-structure clarity is high if all system members' descriptions of the decisionmaking processes are similar, i.e., if the "rank and file" see the process as being the same as top decisionmakers see it. (As used here, clarity refers to agreement on how decisions are made and not agreement that decisionmaking is confused. In the context of this study, the former would be regarded as high decision-structure clarity, the latter as not.)

#### *Decision-Structure Legitimacy*

This concept contains two dimensions: legitimacy within the units making the decisions and legitimacy between the units. "Within-unit legitimacy" refers to legitimacy as it is usually conceptualized, i.e., belief by members in the rightness, propriety, or moral goodness of the structure irrespective of the specific outcomes of decisions (Dahl, 1963). "Between-unit legitimacy" refers to the "backing" afforded one group's decision-structure by another group (Stinchcombe, 1968). For example, a faculty senate may need to call upon the board of trustees or AAUP to back up a decision it has made. Obviously, the senate has more "between-unit legitimacy" if it is seen as legitimate by these external groups.

In general, for purposes of discussion of the literature, the more commonly understood meaning of legitimacy (within-unit) will be used. But for studies that focus on interorganizational interaction rather than on internal decisionmaking, the between-unit legitimacy would be more profitably emphasized.

It is important for research purposes to maintain the distinction between legitimacy and the related concept of membership satisfaction. A subtle but important distinction exists between the sense of rightness or propriety of a decisionmaking arrangement and the desirability of the arrangement (the satisfaction one derives from it). One may be satisfied with an illegitimate decisionmaking structure if he is benefiting personally under that system or if he does not place a high value on legitimacy itself. But legitimacy may also be seen as a subset of satisfaction, if a person highly values the legitimacy of the system (for example, derives satisfaction from being in a democracy).

The distinction is between satisfaction with the outcome (i.e., the realization of one's values) and legitimacy as the rightness of the decisionmaking arrangement.

### *Mobilization of Bias*

This concept is important for its measurement implications. As E. E. Schattschneider (1960) has suggested:

All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because *organization is the mobilization of bias*. Some issues are organized into politics, while others are organized out [p. 71]

This notion suggests that the researcher must remain aware of the possible existence of "non-issues"—matters which may fail to become issues because of anticipated defeat—and take steps to avoid confusing compliance with contentment. One might find in a given college, for example, that the faculty may not bother to raise certain issues because they "know" they stand no chance of prevailing.

### ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

The effective organization is one that can successfully gain resources, arrive at collective goals, convert the resources into goal attainment, and maintain membership satisfaction.

#### *Resource Acquisition*

Yuchtman (1967) defines organizational effectiveness in terms of an organization's capacity in either absolute or relative terms to acquire *scarce* and *valued* resources from the environment; an effective organization is a good bargainer. It is clear that for any organization to accomplish its goals, it must have resources. One can expect differences between colleges, for example, in the capacity to acquire the scarce and important resources of money, students, and faculty.

Because problems arise when one attempts to compare organizations with different resource bases, the notion of a "potential resource base" may be useful in making the resource acquisition measure more comparable across widely separated organizations. Such a base would be composed of those goods which are convertible into usable resources by the organization, whereas the acquired re-

sources are those goods that already have been successfully transformed from potential to actual goods. Without such a distinction, it would be easy to confuse a "fortunate" organization with an "effective" one, that is, give resource acquisition credit when no attempt by the organization has gone into creating the resources. Certainly an organization that acquires X units of needed resources when only X+1 units are available in the potential resource base is more effective than an organization that acquires X units of needed resources when X+50 units are available. It may be difficult, at times, to separate the potential resources which are naturally available from those that are actually acquired as a result of policy decisions. The decision, for example, to move a college from a rural setting to a major metropolitan area is resource acquisition resulting from institutional decisionmaking, whereas a natural increase of the population of a city may increase the potential resource base (the number of prospective students), without this being a function of institutional effort. Therefore, it seems wise to use a ratio of potential to acquired resources instead of using only acquired resources as a measure of organizational effectiveness.

(Because of practical limitations, no measure was made of potential resource bases in the pilot cases; therefore, caution will be used in interpreting resource acquisition in the pilot study.)

#### *Goal Formation and Goal Attainment*

Other theorists with a more cybernetic approach have conceived of effectiveness as the capacity of the total system to take action on behalf of the system as a whole (Deutsch, 1963; Etzioni, 1968a). Such an organization can combine *control* of the system by the use of power with the building of *consensus* through information; it can set goals (or revise them) and accomplish them. Etzioni (1968a) calls this kind of system "active," Deutsch (1963) calls it "self-willed," and Warren (1970) refers to it as "viability," or the ability to control problems and take necessary action. In short, these types of effectiveness refer to the capacity both to set and attain goals.

A problem exists with the concept of goal attainment when there is no clear definition of institutional goals, that is, when a consensus about goals does not exist. The institution is then considered low on goal-setting effectiveness, and in such a situation one



inevitably must ask the question: Whose goals are being attained?

In considering this question, it is imperative to keep in mind that the same level of analysis must be maintained regardless of the absence of consensus: it is the goals for the institution that are of interest here, not the goals for any one unit. The institution is the level of analysis, not the unit. Even when little agreement exists on institutional goals, some group is in a position to articulate and implement a set of institutional goals. The group may be the board of trustees, a select group of administrators, or some other institutional coalition of members.\* The institutional goals being attained are those of the dominant coalition in the case of low consensus, or of the entire membership in the case of high consensus.

### *Membership Satisfaction*

Another means of judging the effectiveness of a system has been to determine the adequacy of services provided to members of the system and the absence of systematic bias against the values of any group (Ostrom, 1961). The more effective the system, the higher the probability that any member taken at random will be having his values optimized. The application to the college setting is clear. Faculty members, students, administrators, and alumni have values with respect to the college which may or may not be realized.\*\*

This concept, as defined, refers to the extent to which members of the system realize their individual values, or goals, rather than collective ones. In public service terms, it is the extent to which the community is meeting the needs of its citizens.

When operationalized, a difficulty with this concept becomes apparent. Three related types of satisfaction may be measured, none of which corresponds precisely with the concept of satisfaction as defined above. These are satisfaction with the college as a whole,

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\*This conception of institutional goals is discussed in Thompson (1967, p. 121).

\*\*Some students of organizations may object to the inclusion of membership satisfaction as a criterion of effectiveness. It is included here for three reasons: (1) Membership satisfaction is an important outcome in its own right in communities and nations and therefore should be included here to increase the generalizability of this research, (2) Increases in satisfaction may lead to increases in other dimensions of effectiveness, and (3) If all other effectiveness criteria are equal, one certainly prefers to have satisfied members.

satisfaction with the decisionmaking rules (constitutional satisfaction), and satisfaction with the performance of leaders under the constitution.

There is no ipso facto reason to rule out any of these three types of satisfaction, except that there is no measure of the salience of these values for each individual, and satisfaction with the constitution and leadership performance with respect to that constitution come quite close to the notion of legitimacy.

The analysis of relationships in this work, however, will use a measure of satisfaction which does not attempt to delineate the various aspects of satisfaction, but will merely attempt to determine the degree to which the institution as a whole is allowing individuals to realize their values (meeting their needs).\*

The four criteria of effectiveness may yield quite different conclusions. For example, what is good for the whole college may not be good for the individual faculty member or student. Previous discussions on the effects of decisionmaking structures have utilized one or more of these four types of effectiveness (Aiken, 1969; Clark, 1968b; Paulson et al., 1969; Price, 1968; Turk, 1970; and Warren, 1970), but none has incorporated all four simultaneously.

## INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF THE CONCEPTS

### *Dependent Variables*

The attainment by an organization of its goals is clearly the mark of an effective organization, and has been used as the chief criterion variable in other studies (Price, 1968). But as regards organizational effectiveness, dimensions other than goal attainment derived from political theory and community studies are equally important as indicators of organizational effectiveness.


Goal formation logically precedes goal attainment, and an

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\*Some notion of what members *expect* from their institution is necessary in order to understand the satisfaction level. Applying the concept of "reference groups" alerts one to the possibility that the members of a particular college may take as a point of reference other high prestige institutions, neighboring schools of low prestige, past practices at their own school, an ideal image of the college, or the college's own constitution. The satisfaction level expressed by these members is likely to depend quite heavily on which of these reference groups is utilized.


organization must be able to formulate goals before it can attain them. For an organization to attain its formulated goals, it must be able to acquire needed resources. Resource acquisition can be taken as a direct indicator of effectiveness, as Yuchtman (1967) suggests, or it can be taken as a capability which increases the likelihood of goal attainment. Finally, an organization that promotes membership satisfaction is more effective than one that cannot. Satisfaction can be viewed here as both an end in itself and a means to greater goal attainment because, as membership satisfaction increases, commitment to the organization also increases, and this commitment can be viewed as a resource for goal attainment.

The interrelationships between these indicators of effectiveness can be represented as follows:



Further, projections about the probabilities of membership satisfaction and resource acquisition may in themselves affect the formulation of goals.

In addition to these interconnections, one can note other possible reciprocal causalities among three of the indicators.



Here, membership satisfaction is increased by the attainment of more resources (better salaries for everyone, for example) and also by goal attainment (providing personal gratification through collective accomplishment). Resource acquisition is improved by goal attainment (people will give more freely to a "going concern" than to one that is not achieving its goals). These interrelationships will be in evidence throughout the following discussion of related research, and in the hypothesized optimal structure.

### *Independent Variables*

By separating amount of participation (proportion of membership involved in decisionmaking) and centricity (number and autonomy of centers of decisionmaking), and treating them as dimensions of a two-dimensional property space, one can determine an intersect value based on measurements of the two dimensions. This intersect value is more representative of reality than a single value derived from a unidimensional concept of decisionmaking structure.

Having generated a two-dimensional property space on which each of the eight decision types can be plotted (see Figure 1), one can then generate a second order concept that refers to the configuration of all decision types on these dimensions. The concept of interest here is "decision-structure variance," which refers to any diversity of decisionmaking arrangements among the eight decision types in a particular school.

One should note that the first order variables (amount of participation and centricity) and the second order variable (decision-structure variance) are not fully independent. For example, if one selects organizations to be studied which are at the extremes of the amount of participation and centricity continuums, then the possibility for high variance among decisionmaking arrangements is reduced. However, if one is aware of this interdependence and makes allowance for it when interpreting the effects of the two orders of independent variables, then they can be separately analyzed.

Similarly, decision-structure clarity is not independent of amount of participation. If amount of participation is high, then the likelihood of the decisionmaking structure being clearly perceived by all participants is increased. Nevertheless, one can imagine two highly participatory systems which differ considerably in the degree to which the participants are accurately aware of the existing decisionmaking arrangements. Consequently, decision-structure clarity can be treated as a separate concept.

Decision-structure legitimacy is also not independent of amount of participation. In a culture dominated by democratic norms, a system in which participation is high is likely to be more legitimate than one in which participation is low. Nevertheless, since the degree of decision-structure legitimacy can be a function of leadership expertise or external conditions, such as war, as well as a result of the amount of participation, this concept will also be retained as a separate variable.

## SUMMARY

In sum, one can demonstrate some of the probable interrelationships between the independent variables, coupled with interrelationships between the dependent variables, (Fig. 3).




FIGURE 3. Probable Relationships Within the Set of Independent Variables and Within the Set of Dependent Variables.

Hypothesizing the nature of the connections between the independent and dependent variables constitutes the major thrust of this work. A consideration of related theory and empirical research in political science and sociology will provide the beginning of the search for additional linkages between sets of variables, as well as further establishing the linkages suggested above.

## RELATED THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

### *Amount of Participation*

Regarding the relation between amount of participation and the acquisition of resources (federal funds, in this case) and goal formation (deciding to institute the federal program), several re-

searchers have found that a low degree of participation was positively related to program innovation, e.g., urban renewal, fluoridation, Operation Head Start (Crain et al., 1969; Gamson, 1966; Hawley, 1968). In contrast to these studies, a number of other recent studies have found the opposite relationship between amount of participation and program innovation. The higher the participation, the greater the program innovation (Aiken, 1969; Clark, 1968b; Paulson et al., 1969; and Turk, 1970).

One manner of understanding these conflicting results is to examine the unit of analysis used in the research: whether the community as a whole was used (i.e., the municipal council or an executive), or a subunit of the community was used (i.e., the health department, housing authority, or community action organization). As Aiken and Alford (1970) have suggested:

The overall state of a community system may be most important for understanding the community's propensity for innovation across a wide spectrum of issues, but that the appropriate analytic unit for understanding specific innovations, as well as performance in such innovations, is a subsystem of a community in which the central actor is the community decision organization . . . [p. 663].

At a more general level the authors asserted:

It may well be that the structures of relationships within such subsystems are indeed "centralized" in the sense of a given organization having strong central control over units within that issue arena. If this is true, it would suggest that Hawley's thesis (low participation leads to high innovation) may be appropriate if a community subsystem is taken as the unit of analysis [p. 663].

In analyzing the effects of participation on program effectiveness, it would appear that differing amounts of participation are appropriate, depending on the unit of analysis investigated. Oligarchy, for example, may be more effective at one level and democracy at another.

In the college setting, these findings would translate into the following: If collegewide decisionmaking is taken as the unit of analysis, then it can be assumed that high participation by all members representing all groups will lead to higher resource acquisition and goal formation. This suggests that members from faculty, administration, and the student body all ought to be involved in decision-making. However, for specific issues like curricular matters or student activities, then low participation (in the sense of fewer members representing fewer groups), may be more appropriate than high par-

ticipation. In effect, the finding of different relationships between amount of participation and effectiveness, dependent upon the organizational level of analysis, suggests the utility of dividing issues into types of decisions and introducing the notion of federated decisionmaking structures.

Reflecting the desirability of distinguishing among types of decisions, Price (1968) points out the distinction between strategic (goal-setting and other long-term) decisions and tactical (operational, everyday) decisions. He suggests that:

Except where there is a high degree of complexity, organizations which have a high degree of centralization [low participation] with respect to tactical decisions are more likely to have a high degree of effectiveness than organizations which have a low degree of centralization [high participation] with respect to tactical decisions [p. 60].\*

The complement to this statement is that in an organization of high complexity (a college), the relationship between participation in tactical decisions and effectiveness (here defined as goal attainment) is either inverse or nonexistent. Price (1968) suggests that the inverse relationship is the likely one in organizations of high complexity, that high participation increases the probability of goal attainment in tactical decisions. In organizations of high complexity, the degree of specialization is probably high. With high specialization, the dependence of top decisionmakers upon the specialists is high, therefore the participation by those specialists increases.

Support for Price's hypothesis is found in several studies (Galbraith, 1967; Gouldner, 1954; Kaufman, 1960; Marcson, 1960; and Stanton and Schwartz, 1954). Price mentions several other studies which appear at first to contradict the hypothesis (Katz, Maccoby, and Moore, 1950; Seashore and Bowers, 1963), but suggests that in these cases the variations in centralization range only from *very low* participation to *low* participation, and are not inclusive of the total range of participation (from low to high). Therefore, inferences about relationships are questionable. Although this limited range may confound the results of the organizational studies men-

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\*Effectiveness, as used by Price, refers only to goal attainment and not goal formation, membership satisfaction, and resource acquisition. His use of high "centralization" is comparable to the concept of low "participation" used in this study

tioned, it does not do so for colleges where the amount of participation ranges from oligarchic to democratic.

On the point of strategic decisions, Price (1968) suggests that:

Organizations which have the maximum degree of centralization [low participation] with respect to strategic decisions are more likely to have a high degree of effectiveness than organizations which do not have the maximum degree of centralization with respect to strategic decisions [p. 60].

A study of scientists (Marcson, 1960) in one industry showed that although decisions about the everyday conduct of the laboratory were highly participatory, they had little influence on long-range goals of the organization.\*

With respect to the relationship between amount of participation and membership satisfaction, the greater the number of people involved in decisions, the greater the likelihood of membership satisfaction because: When persons are capable of blocking decisions, they can avoid the costs to themselves which otherwise might result from collective decisions. This ability to avoid negative externalities is taken to be more important to persons than the ability to make positive gain through collective action (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).\*\*

The relationship between participation and effectiveness may be more complex than the previously mentioned research would indicate. Thompson (1965), in writing on complex organizations, argues that high participation is more conducive to the successful implementation of innovation than less participation, but suggests, however, that the relationship is curvilinear, that either extreme—monarchy or mass democracy—may be counterproductive for implementation.

In sum, it appears from the above research that there is no

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\*It should be noted, however, that the scientists in this organization may well undermine the strategic decisions by their insistence upon following their own scientific norms of free inquiry, i.e., they may be playing by the rules of the "science game" rather than by the rules of the organization. (In some instances, this scientific independence might have beneficial effects for the company, and thereby increase goal attainment as well.)

\*\*As will be seen in the data, under certain circumstances membership satisfaction is high when the amount of participation is high (as in a highly heterogeneous, competitive political system) and under other circumstances satisfaction may be higher when participation is lower (as when expertise is needed and is manifested by the leader, membership consensus is high, or the system is under threat).



simple relationship between amount of participation and system effectiveness. At some *levels*, wider participation may be more appropriate than at other levels; similarly, in some *circumstances* wider participation may be more appropriate than in other circumstances; and finally, it may be that wider participation is needed for some *types of issues* more than for other types.

### *Centricity*

As noted in the studies on community decisionmaking, the concept of centricity (involving subsystem autonomy), even though theoretically useful for a considerable time, has only recently been taken into account in community and organizational studies.

One should recall that the poles on the centricity continuum are the corporate and the federated structures. A totalitarian state or a pure democracy would both be examples of a corporate structure, whereas the feudal state in which the autonomy of subsystems vis-à-vis the monarch was high represents the other extreme, a federated system. Contemporary examples such as Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and France are corporate (unitary) democracies, whereas Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and Australia are federated democracies (Danl, 1963). In the contemporary college setting, a strong president or community senate would be an indication of a corporate structure, whereas an administrative council, faculty senate, and student senate all active in the same college setting would indicate a federated structure.

The debate over the effectiveness of a corporate as compared with a federated structure dates back to early political philosophy and has strong advocates up to and including current social theorists and researchers. The corporate structure was strongly advocated in the writings of Thomas Hobbes as early as the 17th century. He suggested that the consequence of unrestrained human freedom was the loss of the freedom to pursue one's interest with some hope of success (the war of all against all, or the tyranny of the strong over the weak). He held that order, necessitating the sacrifice of certain freedoms, was a prerequisite for greater freedoms, and that surrender to a single sovereign, assumed to be all-knowing and benevolent, was the optimal solution. Given these assumptions, his decisionmaking structure leads to a highly effective system in serving members' interests and in goal formation. It is just these assumptions, however,

that flaw his work most seriously. Sovereigns are not all-knowing and often are not benevolent, even though a surprising number of people today credit leaders with approximately these traits. (One hears the statement: "Let the president make the decisions; he's got the best information and best interest of the country at heart.") Several persuasive writings demonstrate the difficulties in assuming adequacy of information by the sovereign (Merton, 1957; Tullock, 1965)\*, and dictators of the 20th century have clearly demonstrated that benevolence in high places cannot be assumed.

Other writers more contemporary than Hobbes have argued for the greater effectiveness and, in fact, for the necessity of having one final authority for all matters (Burns, 1967; Riker, 1964; Wilson, 1956). They criticize the federation of decisionmaking as leading to the incapacity of the system to act, charging that it becomes mired in vetoes. This criticism seems valid if one considers only the *simple* federated system, which is defined here as a system with high subsystem autonomy and with little variation in decisionmaking structures across decision types. Too much subsystem autonomy will likely reduce system effectiveness because it tends to leave competing claims unreconciled.

The dilemma of subsystem autonomy and system integration is one of considerable current interest in community research. A number of studies have appeared which concern themselves with the relationship of neighborhood control to city integration. As Warren (1970) has written: "Neighborhood adaptation, by jeopardizing community-level integration, may decrease community viability." Without doing too much violence to this notion, one could substitute terms so that it reads, "Faculty or departmental autonomy, by jeopardizing college integration, may decrease college effectiveness" (effectiveness seen as goal formation and goal implementation). Herein lies one of the dangers inherent in the simple federated system.

At the national level, one can observe that if the national government is federated to the point where local control is complete, then there is no appeal for a minority that objects to the majority's actions in this local community. This leads one to conclude that

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\*Currently there is in this country strong concern about the withholding of information by government officials from the public. This represents the problem of information flow in the opposite direction, but nevertheless emphasizes the importance of considering information flow generally as a problem in political systems.

simple federation (subsystem autonomy), if not accompanied by alternative authority structures, may lead to tyranny (lowered citizen satisfaction).

The simple federated system will probably also suffer in its acquisition of resources. If an organization is fractured, it may become less capable of speaking to its environment with a single voice to acquire resources. For example, a state college which cannot coordinate the several unit budget requests within the college will be less likely to receive the requested monies than one which presents a "united front." Furthermore, if the units in a simple federated system can acquire their own resources independently of the larger organization, as in the case of faculty gaining complete support from a funding agency and establishing a self-supporting institute, then for all practical purposes, several organizations exist rather than one.\*

#### *Decision-Structure Variance (The Compound System)*

By introducing the notion of different types of decisions and variations in decisionmaking arrangements across these decision types, one can increase the likelihood of effectiveness in both federated and corporate structures by forming a compound system; the system thus becomes corporate for some types of decisions and federated for others.

Following in the tradition of Hamilton and Madison's *Federalist* papers, one can assess the probable effectiveness of an organization composed of a variety of decisionmaking structures. Hamilton and Madison presented a carefully conceived scheme of a compound republic (here a compound system). In their view, human beings are self-interested (otherwise they wouldn't need government) and fallible (in contrast to the Hobbesian view). Given this view of human nature, decisionmaking needs to be structured in such a way that it balances self-interests. The theory of the compound republic (Ostrom, 1969)\*\* states that security from tyranny is greatest (satis-

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\*This observation holds for any *completely* federated system; it ceases to be a single organization and becomes several.

\*\*For a very readable and more recent set of lectures on this subject see Vincent Ostrom, *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration* University of Alabama Press, 1973.

faction is maximized) when the government is divided both horizontally and vertically, thus balancing interests, with decisions being made at the appropriate level: National defense, for example, should be secured by the national government, whereas protection of one's neighborhood from vandals may well be best secured by the local neighborhood.

Furthermore, in a compound system, as would be found in a community, there is overlapping of services so that one might call either the city police, the county sheriff, the state police, or the FBI for assistance. These overlapping jurisdictions, rather than being viewed as inefficient, are seen to be the most efficient structure in the provision of services and the avoidance of tyranny.\* This vertical division is coupled with a horizontal division, as in the case of the checks among the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government. The essential point of the compound system is the variation of decision-structures for various types of decisions. (These various decision-structures differ both in amount of participation and in number of groups involved as separate decisionmaking bodies.)\*\*

Galbraith (1967) has shown that compounding the decision-making structure is not only desirable but unavoidable in a large complex industry. He demonstrates that certain types of decisions which affect top-level decisions nevertheless are made largely by the middle-level "technostructure" because of their special knowledge not shared by top management. His writing has special relevance for college governance since the faculty, for example, as technocrats with special competence often not shared by administrators, students, or board members, has the decisionmaking prerogatives on academic policy, and its decisions are challenged only with some peril to the organization. Similarly, certain administrators (planning and budget officers, for example) have expertise which increases their decisionmaking autonomy.

In the 19th century Tocqueville suggested one outcome of the compound system when he wrote:

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\*Landau (1969) has written a persuasive piece on the virtues of organizational redundancy which argues for just such overlapping as leading to increased rather than decreased efficiency

\*\*The notion of a compound system is useful for viewing the "monolithic-polyarchical elite" debate. It may be that for certain types of decisions, the power structure is monolithic and for other types, it is polyarchical. In other words, it may be inappropriate to view community power as separate from specific types of issues

In no country in the world do the citizens make such exertions for the commonweal. I know of no people who have established schools so numerous and efficacious, places of public worship better suited to the wants of the inhabitants, or roads kept in better repair. Uniformity or permanence of design, the minute arrangement of details and the perfection of administrative system must not be sought for in the United States, what we find there is the presence of a power which, if it is somewhat wild, is at least robust, and an existence checkered with accident, indeed, but full of animation and effect [1945, pp. 76-77].

Here Tocqueville alluded to the capacity of the system to generate power, to acquire resources (membership effort), and to attain goals. Lindblom (1965), in a similar vein, has argued for the effectiveness of a system in which there is no ultimate authority, but rather different authorities for different functions, each cooperating with one another because of their interdependent interests.

Buchanan and Tullock (1962) have called attention to the necessity of establishing different decision rules for different types of issues, bearing in mind the costs of the decisionmaking itself. For example, faculty involvement in university or college governance is a costly process (considering the time given by highly trained personnel), a cost which must be balanced by the benefit gained from such involvement. Also, students have studying to do, which may be interfered with by their involvement in decisionmaking. Buchanan and Tullock's perspective would suggest that a simple decision-structure would not be effective in a democratic corporate structure, since the decisionmaking costs would be so great.

At the same time, Buchanan and Tullock also point out the notion of *external costs*, i.e., the undesirable "spillover" of decisions made by one group onto another group which had no voice in the decision.\* For example, the faculty, acting autonomously on curricular matters, might make decisions which would seriously cut down the number of students attending the college, thereby imposing serious costs on the college. The possibility of such external costs suggests that a corporate oligarchic system or a simple federated system will not be as effective as either system compounded.

What emerges then is the fact that the corporate system has

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\*The concept of external costs should be understood as costs imposed by one group's decisionmaking onto others. The economic notion, "negative externalities," is synonymous with external costs.

the virtue of being able to make decisive moves, such as those called for in a war, while the federated structure has the virtue of keeping decisions close to those having knowledge of the circumstances necessitating a decision, but that neither structure, taken alone, will be effective along all the dimensions of effectiveness. Only after having introduced the concept of decision-structure variance, generating a compound system, which implies the need to vary the decisionmaking structure according to the type of decision being made, can all the various criteria of effectiveness be met.

#### *Decision-Structure Legitimacy*

The relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness (goal attainment) has been suggested by Price (1968) in summarizing several organization studies:

Organizations which have a high degree of legitimacy are more likely to have a higher degree of effectiveness than organizations which have a low degree of legitimacy [p. 49].


Blau's study (1955) of a state employment agency shows the positive effects of legitimacy on effective goal attainment, and Sykes' study (1958) of a maximum security prison shows the same relationship when legitimacy is absent: effectiveness is reduced.

Legitimacy varies markedly in colleges and universities, a fact that is not surprising, given their variety of decisionmaking practices. A methodological problem exists here, however. It may be that in a culture with a democratic ideology, any decisionmaking structure which deviates from that ideal will be judged as illegitimate, especially in higher educational institutions at a time when authority itself (the authority accruing from position) is under challenge. It may be that the amount of participation, legitimacy, and satisfaction are empirical variables which overlap heavily.

Furthermore, legitimacy and goal attainment may be linked to the amount of participation in the following manner:

Amount of Participation → Legitimacy → Goal Attainment

It is also possible that the presence of goal attainment will affect the likelihood of legitimacy occurring, and that legitimacy will affect the amount of participation. Thus, the causal linkages may also appear as:



When conducting research, special care should be exercised to identify the causal linkages between other variables and legitimacy.\*

With respect to the effect of legitimacy on resource acquisition, it stands to reason that a legitimate power could command more resources than a nonlegitimate one. One of the resources so commanded would be membership commitment, a resource of no small importance. Potential donors to an institution are also more likely to donate to it when they consider it to be governed legitimately.

#### *Decision-Structure Clarity*

Caplow and McGee's (1958) landmark study of the academic profession called attention to the probable effect of low decision-structure clarity on institutional effectiveness. They attribute this phenomenon to the difficulty in colleges and universities in attaching authority and enforcement power to specific roles within the institution, leading to unclear decisionmaking processes:

Power cannot . . . be tied to specific positions in the form of authority, since such fixation would inevitably establish relationships of subordination and equality which were inconsistent with another set of social facts. Yet power in some form must be exercised or the university cannot function. . . . The solution to this dilemma which has evolved in the American university is to let power lodge pretty much where it may. The fundamental device by which stresses in the university are resolved is a kind of lawlessness, consisting of vague and incomplete rules and ambiguous and uncoded procedures. . . . This system of loose-lying power helps to account for the extraordinarily high incidence of conflict reported in the universities we studied and the widespread and passionate dissatisfaction of professors with the workings of academic government [p 206-7].

Caplow and McGee have suggested that confusion over decision-making norms is widespread in American colleges and universities, and that this confusion contributes to their inability to take effective action when necessary. Low decision-structure clarity, in effect, contributes to a lack of effective goal formation and goal attainment.

\*The reverse causal linkages are suggested here for researchers wishing to concentrate on legitimacy as a key variable in their own research. For purposes of this work, however, legitimacy will be treated primarily as an independent variable.



Further corroboration of this relationship has been offered by Clark (1964) and McConnell (1971). One would expect to find evidence in future studies that this lack of clarity also contributes to lowered membership satisfaction and resource acquisition.

### **SUGGESTED RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURE AND EFFECTIVENESS**

The research reviewed in this chapter suggests that amount of participation alone does not reflect the variations of conceivable decisionmaking arrangements as they bear on effectiveness. Furthermore, even when the number and autonomy of groups (centricity) is added as a concept, the possible variations leading to effectiveness are not represented. It is only by combining the amount of participation and centricity to produce a higher order concept—decision-structure variance—that the optimal arrangement of decisionmaking can be represented. This arrangement would seem to be a compound system, with high participation in the highest decisionmaking groups for those institutional decisions that affect all members, and with participation in decisionmaking bearing on areas of expertise confined to those groups of members with the appropriate skills and knowledge. Thus, it is hypothesized that the optimal system is a democratic corporate system for total institutional decisions and a democratic federated system for expert decisions. (The degree of federation will be conditioned by the amount of external costs accruing from “expert” decisions, such as a faculty making curricular decisions which make it necessary for all students to spend an extra year in school.)

Such a compound system leads directly to higher goal formation, goal attainment, and membership satisfaction, and indirectly to higher resource acquisition, and it does so more successfully than any other combinations of amount of participation and centricity. Decision-structure clarity will increase goal attainment, and subsequently also resource acquisition and membership satisfaction. Decision-structure legitimacy will increase goal attainment, resource acquisition, and membership satisfaction directly, and through each one affect the others indirectly.

These sets of relationships, suggested in the literature and diagrammed below (Fig. 4), should be considered tentative causal hypotheses. Following the analysis of the pilot data, a more systematic set of propositions and discussion will be presented.






FIGURE 4. Suggested Relationships Between Decisionmaking Structure and Organizational Effectiveness.

## II.

### *The Conceptual Framework Grounded in the Pilot Data*

Pilot data were collected to better ground the rather abstract and diverse subject matter discussed in Chapter I, to show the possibilities for future hypotheses-testing research, and to add to the critical concepts bearing on decisionmaking and effectiveness. This chapter uses the case material in summarized form; fuller descriptions can be found in the Appendix.

The data were gathered in 1971 at four small, midwestern liberal arts colleges which differed from one another in the degree to which administrators, faculty, and students participated in institutional decisionmaking. Since one of the chief variables to be studied was centrality (the number and autonomy of decisionmaking centers), it was important to choose a research case in which both federated and corporate structures were likely to be found. The relatively small college represents such a case, with faculty, students, and administrators constituting three differentiated interest groups.

Labels have been substituted for the colleges' names to maintain confidentiality and offer the reader a quick referent to the political character of each institution. In order of their decreasing participation in decisionmaking, they are labeled Political College, Consensus College, Brotherhood College, and Conservative College. The colleges are described separately so as to communicate a sense of each institution's character, which itself becomes a variable. Following the characterization of each college is a general statement describing the college in terms of the decision-structure and effectiveness

variables outlined in Chapter 1. The data on the decisionmaking arrangements for each college are then presented in highly summarized form by decision type. This summary chart allows for a further discussion of each decision area in light of the pilot data, and an analysis of the second order variable, decision-structure variance, which is visually represented as a scatter of points on a graph.

Finally, several new concepts, suggested by the pilot data, are presented to more nearly complete the set of variables which are critical in the real cases. It is with this amplified set of concepts that the propositions are formulated in the final chapter.

### THE PILOT CASES: IN BRIEF

The cases alluded to in the pilot data are based on interviews at each college with the president; academic dean; dean of students; AAUP president (where applicable); chairmen of the English, chemistry, and sociology departments, chosen to represent the humanities, physical and social sciences, respectively; several new social science faculty members; and the student body president and other key student leaders who were available. In addition, a member of the faculty identified by informants as being very active in campus politics was usually interviewed at some length.

#### *Institutional Characterizations*

##### POLITICAL COLLEGE

*This highly political, highly participatory college demonstrates how conflicts in the allocation of authority can result in legitimacy problems; the advantages and disadvantages of high participation in decisions about resource allocation; and the institutional resources that are gained as a result of high participation in overall decisionmaking.*

Located in a small midwestern town, Political College was founded by the Christian Church, but is presently an independent, nonaffiliated institution. It presents itself as a democratic community in which students, faculty, and administrators share in institutional decisionmaking toward the achievement of continual educational innovation and the preservation of liberal education of a high quality. This college, ranked in an AAUP study (1971) as the first in the nation for faculty participation in decisionmaking, is one of the

most "political" colleges in the country. There is a keen sense of awareness on the part of all the colleges' citizens about decisionmaking activities, constant conflicts over the maintenance of one's decisionmaking prerogatives, and keen competition for the acquisition of new prerogatives.

Over the past three decades there have been continual discussions, debates, and outright conflict over the decisionmaking prerogatives of the president vis-à-vis the administrative council (composed of administrators, faculty, and students). Anyone visiting the campus is impressed by the amount of time and energy invested by a large proportion of students and faculty in decisionmaking activities, as well as by the degree of political "savvy" the average sophomore student demonstrates.

In general, Political College exhibits a moderately high decision-structure variance and very high decision-structure clarity. Faculty satisfaction with *performance* under the constitution is low, although satisfaction with the constitution itself is high. Goal formation is weak, as evidenced by the continual discord over the future directions of the institution.

#### CONSENSUS COLLEGE

*This college provides an example of a fairly high degree of participation in decisionmaking with one major difference from Political College. Decisions here are made by consensus. One can see evidence that suggests both the importance of shared cultural norms for consensus decisionmaking, and the high degree of effectiveness of organizations able to operate on this basis.*

Consensus College, located in a small midwestern town, was founded by the Society of Friends. It portrays itself, in its catalog, as an "educational community where faculty and students attempt to live and work together in a spirit of openness and to share significantly in the search for wisdom and truth." One of its most salient features, for any visitor to the campus, but particularly for the student of decisionmaking, is the Quaker tradition of consensus decisionmaking. In this system no formal vote is taken on an issue. Instead, the group discusses the issue thoroughly, working through accommodations to the various objections until the chairman of the group asks, "Is there a consensus?" If there is no response, the chairman records a decision by consensus. If a member objects to the proposal in question, he may respond that he cannot support it, asking to be recorded as

dissenting but not willing to block action, or he may state that in no way can he in good conscience agree with the proposal, in which case action is stopped. (One should note here that action has rarely been blocked by only one dissenter, but rather by a group of dissenters.) If there is no consensus, action is postponed until a later time, when another attempt is made to achieve consensus—on a somewhat altered proposal, or perhaps on the same one, after further informal discussion.

Underlying this style of decisionmaking is a strong set of norms that encourages cooperation for the good of the community and respect for individual conscience. It is assumed that one will not block action except for good reason, usually a matter of conscience. Conversely, it is assumed that the community will respect the right of a person to block action if he feels strongly.\* As will be shown below, not all institutional decisions are made in this consensus manner because not all issues are brought before the community—a fact which reveals one method by which the consensus procedure is circumvented.

Another distinctive feature of the college is the conscious effort to reduce the usual cleavages between faculty, students, and administrators, and to reduce stratification within these groups. The practice of using full-name appellations, e.g., Tom Smith instead of Dr. Smith, for all members of the college both reflects this commitment to equality and contributes to it. No distinctions in privilege within the faculty are made by academic rank except for salary, and distinctions between classes of students (e.g., freshmen, seniors) are unimportant. A further attempt to blur the lines between the faculty and administration is evidenced by the numerous joint faculty-administration appointments.

What one in fact sees at Consensus College is stratification by degree of influence, which may or may not be consistent with length of tenure. The Quaker phrase, "He is a weighty person," reflects the fact that some persons' viewpoints on any matter are taken more seriously than others. In other words, stratification of authority is based on "person" and "competence" rather than on "position." (See Peabody, 1962, for a good discussion of these distinctions.)

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\*This strategy of decisionmaking is extremely interesting, in light of the general concern in democratic theory (as in Dahl, 1956) with taking intensity of preference into account. In effect, in consensus decisionmaking each citizen is given the right of veto over action if he feels *sufficiently intensely* about the matter—sufficient by whatever standard he himself uses.

In general, Consensus College exhibits high consensus and decision-structure clarity, and moderately high decision-structure variance. The faculty, students, and administrators are highly satisfied; resource acquisition is fairly high; goal formation is excellent; and goal attainment is good.

#### **BROTHERHOOD COLLEGE**

*This institution provides a graphic example of the effect of cultural homogeneity on both the decisionmaking structure itself and the effectiveness of that structure. Because of what is evidently the reciprocal trust of faculty, students, and administrators, institutional effectiveness is not strongly related to any formally prescribed manner of participation. Legitimacy is extremely high and clarity is not an issue.*

Brotherhood College, located in a small midwestern town, was founded by the Mennonite Church. It portrays itself, in its catalog, as an institution "designed to impart a high standard of Christian Service." Strongly dominated by the Mennonite Church, the college is owned by a Mennonite Board of Education, governed by a Mennonite Board of Overseers (trustees), administered by Mennonites, with a faculty and student body made up primarily of Mennonites. It is safe to describe this college as culturally homogeneous.

Several aspects of the Mennonite culture are noteworthy as a context in which decisionmaking processes occur. According to one of the faculty informants, his own father's generation of Mennonites still consider political activities, such as voting or running for office, as a violation of the principle of separation of church and state. It was argued that a man who voted for another man owed allegiance to that man rather than to God. This faculty informant felt that the strength of the desire by faculty for extensive involvement in institutional decisionmaking was diminished by this feature of the Mennonite ethic. A student leader who was interviewed said that he had felt some misgivings about running for a political office at the college because his grandfather would disapprove of such political activity.

Another cultural factor mentioned by a second faculty member is the deeply held belief that all men are brothers, of equal worth, and trustworthy albeit fallible. This faculty member suggested that this ideology greatly affected attitudes toward decisionmaking and decisionmakers. Belief in equality and fallibility, he suggested,

leads the president and other administrators to act with less arrogance and certainly to seek a broad consensus on important matters affecting the college. This ideology also makes everyone feel freer to offer advice to any one in a position to make decisions, which results in more widespread participation in decisionmaking than is formally prescribed.

A third relevant feature of the Mennonite Church is its emphasis on nonconformity, which is important with regard to inter-institutional influences and pressures for change. If one sees his institution as not bound by the behavior of others, external sources of change will be weakened.

A fourth feature of the Church, which is somewhat paradoxical if one takes a broad view of what is political, is the emphasis on community effort, i.e., collective effort toward the common good. Evidently a distinction is made between banding together for common action and running for office to accomplish the same thing.

These ideological factors provide the milieu for decisionmaking and should be borne in mind while considering decisionmaking at this college. In general, Brotherhood College exhibits high trust; satisfaction is quite high; and decision-structure variance is moderately high. The entire process is highly legitimate; goal formation and attainment seem high.

#### CONSERVATIVE COLLEGE

*The evidence from this college suggests that certain benefits can accrue from a system of concurrent regimes; that oligarchic decisionmaking about resource acquisition has a mixed effect; that the control of information is an effective weapon in the struggle for decisionmaking prerogatives; and that the clarity of the decisionmaking structure affects members' satisfaction.*

This college, founded by Free Will Baptists, portrays itself as an institution dedicated to offering its students an increased appreciation of the "American Way of Life." Apart from a similar statement of purpose in the college catalog, other indicators of the politically conservative character of the college are evidenced by the following examples: The president has formally eschewed any state or federal aid in a "Declaration of Independence"; the Dow Chemical Company maintains a training center on campus at a time when many colleges would not openly associate with such organizations; all students are required to enroll in an American Heritage course

that emphasizes the free enterprise system; and finally, the college's student body is drawn heavily from well-to-do families from the eastern part of the United States.

This institution has recently undergone an accreditation site visit and subsequent constitutional revision. To better understand the degree of membership satisfaction with present practices, one needs to be aware of the context in which the constitutional change occurred; many faculty members, for example, had vivid memories of extreme oligarchic presidential rule prior to the site visit. According to several faculty informants, that past period could be characterized as a "Byzantine Court."

The faculty members interviewed felt that they were able to use the accrediting team for leverage in raising the priority of the building of a new library, having faculty salaries raised dramatically, and gaining a powerful role in the drafting of a new constitution for the college.

The oligarchic rule of the past and the present perceptions of the large influence of the faculty members in the allocation of authority (constitutional decisionmaking) combine to affect the present level of faculty satisfaction with the college.

In general, Conservative College now—as contrasted with the period prior to the site visit—manifests a semi-legitimate structure with variable clarity—high at times, and low at other times. Decision-structure variance is low. Membership satisfaction is medium, but improved, and goal formation and goal consensus is medium low.

#### *The Pilot Data Summarized*

The following charts (Table 2) contain summary descriptions of the manner in which decisions were made in each of the four colleges. From the data presented in this form, it is possible to abstract several salient features. By reading across the rows for a particular decision type (disregarding college and level), one can get a sense of the characteristics and typical decisionmaking pattern for that particular type of decision. Having developed a composite for the four decision types, one can compare the characteristics of each type. For example, an initial scrutiny indicates that production decisions in general appear to be more federated and democratic than seems to be the case with authority allocation decisions, which are more likely to vary across a wider range of participation—from oligar-



chic to democratic--while being organized in a corporate manner. The decision type composites will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Alternatively, by reading down the columns for a particular college, one can determine the amount of variation in decisionmaking arrangements across the various decision types and levels for that college. It is then possible to compare these variances between the colleges. The comparisons will be presented in the graphic representations which follow the discussion of decision types.

## DECISION TYPES

Decisions about allocation of authority and allocation of resources constitute the core of the decisionmaking process in any institution, and it is these two types of decisions that account for the most critical variations in decisionmaking between institutions of higher learning (AAUP, 1971). As a preliminary step to the reconsideration of the conceptual framework and variable relationships, the events reported in the pilot cases are summarized into general statements about each of the four decision types.

### *Authority Allocation*

Decisions on authority allocation, being decisions about who shall decide who shall decide, i.e., constitutional decisions, are the most fundamental of all decisions. Constitutional decisions come prior to decisions about resource allocation because they determine where the authority to allocate resources should lie. Notwithstanding the fact that, in all of the colleges studied, the board of trustees had final determination in these decisions, the legitimacy of this arrangement is being questioned by faculty, students, and administrators.

It is important to recall that political theorists have, for good reasons, placed constitutional decisions (allocation of authority) at a different level from all other decisions. These are the decisions that "rig the game," that is, that make the rules for decisionmaking, and they therefore require more widespread assent if the process is to continue without the inevitable costs in organizational time and energy that result from attempts to enforce rules that were established without consensus. Consequently, in many political units con-

TABLE 2. Summary of Decisionmaking for Each College by Issue Type and Level

	POLITICAL COLLEGE			CONSENSUS COLLEGE		
	SYSTEM LEVEL	UNIT LEVEL	SYSTEM LEVEL	SYSTEM LEVEL	UNIT LEVEL	UNIT LEVEL
AUTHORITY ALLOCATION DECISIONS	I Highly Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking Internal groups allocated special decisionmaking prerogatives as a matter of constitution. Institutional chartering of faculty council participation with president and board in allocation of authority decisions.	V Moderately Democratic, Federated Decisionmaking The manner in which allocation of authority decisions within units is made varies between units. However, in all cases, there are no written specifications as to the case for system level authority allocation decision-making. The decisions are made informally and generally authority is allocated by consultation between unit directors and department chairmen. Heads of departments are members of the unit. There is high unit autonomy in these decisions.	I Highly Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking Recently approved faculty report on decisionmaking represents high degree of involvement in allocation of authority decisions. Decisions are categorized as requiring consultative, joint or determinative action by faculty and students.	V Moderately Democratic, Federated Decisionmaking The allocation of authority within units varies between units. Decisions are made informally and generally authority is allocated by consultation between unit directors and members of the unit. There is high unit autonomy in these decisions.		
	II Highly Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking No institutional long range planning. In short range budgeting, several faculty/student committees report to joint faculty/student administrative council in open hearings on budget recommendations. Administrative council has authority to raise or lower.	VI Moderately Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Academic departments and administrative units can distinguish between authority decisions and decisions specified by the administrative council. Teaching assignments are made jointly by the dean and department chairmen. Department chairmen are appointed by the dean in consultation with department members. Chairmanships are rotating. Committee appointments are made by dean in consultation with administrative council and community council officers.	II Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking Faculty representative on administrative budget committee. Decisions of this committee are subject to review by entire faculty. Little long range planning. The distinctive process of decisionmaking by department chairs assesses the impact of participation at this college.	VI Moderately Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking There is high autonomy in the expenditure of unit funds once budget allocation has been agreed upon. Committee appointments are made jointly by administration and faculty except for two key committees, elected by ballot. Teaching assignments are made by department chairmen in consultation with faculty. Department chairmen are elected from within department. We appoint and elect faculty. Faculty Affairs Committee Chairmanships rotate every 3 years.		
RESOURCE ACQUISITION DECISIONS	III Moderately Democratic, Moderately Corporate Decisionmaking President has wide discretion in the acquisition of resources. Joint participation by administrative council and board in the selection of the president and dean prescribed as a matter of written constitution (charter). Faculty recruited by dean in consultation with departments and administrative council. Joint faculty/student review of retention and tenure decisions.	VII Moderately Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Department chairmen, in consultation with departmental members, are the chief decisionmakers in the acquisition of unit funds (determining size of unit budget). Decisions bearing on the acquisition of particular unit personnel are participated in by higher administrators and members of the unit.	III Highly Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking Broadly representative participation in selection of top administrative positions. Distinctive consensus decisionmaking arrangement gives participants great influence.	VII Moderately Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Department chairmen in consultation with departmental members are the chief decisionmakers in the acquisition of unit funds. Decisions bearing on the acquisition of particular unit personnel are participated in by higher administrators and members of the unit.		
	IV Highly Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Faculty have absolute authority on curricular decisions and operate through a curriculum committee. Degree requirements set by faculty. Admissions criteria set by joint faculty/student committee.	VIII Highly Democratic, Federated Decisionmaking Great amount of autonomy for faculty and students in the conduct of their affairs. Faculty members as long as departments continue to offer courses leading to a degree. Administrative autonomy is low, as a result of the heavy participation by other internal constituencies in the conduct of administrative affairs.	IV Highly Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Faculty have final authority on curricular matters, with student participation in faculty set degree requirements and admissions standards.	VIII Highly Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Faculty have autonomy in the conduct of their affairs. Students are consulted regarding the rules and regulations for student conduct, but final determination rests with the board.		

	BROTHERHOOD COLLEGE		CONSERVATIVE COLLEGE	
	SYSTEM LEVEL	UNIT LEVEL	SYSTEM LEVEL	UNIT LEVEL
AUTHORITY ALLOCATION DECISIONS	I Oligarchic, Corporate Decisionmaking A constitutional revision of the College Community Government is presently underway. However, this revision does not bear significantly on the allocation of authority at this college. Tradition has determined the distribution of authority.	V Oligarchic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Questions concerning the allocation of authority rarely arise here. It is assumed that the chairmen will govern as little as possible as is the case in system level decisions about the allocation of authority at this college. Tradition rules and decisions of the redistribution of authority do not arise.	I Oligarchic, Corporate Decisionmaking Generally low participation in these decisions in terms of making a difference in the authority structure. Recently adopted constitution merely clarified existing practices giving the president veto power over all institutional decisions.	V Oligarchic, Corporate Decisionmaking Department chairmen being administrative appointees have their authority specified by the administration. Some variations between departments are evident but these are slight.
	II Oligarchic, Corporate Decisionmaking Decisions are made by a few administrators and the board. Faculty students and lower level administrators only submit unit budget requests.	VI Highly Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Individual units have fairly high autonomy in the allocation of resources. Faculty and students have been consulted to them. Faculty are placed on committees by the president, and students are appointed by the officers of the College Community Government. Teaching assignments are made within the department. Department chairmen are appointed by the president and dean in consultation with department members. Chairmanships rotate periodically.	II Oligarchic, Corporate Decisionmaking Decisions are made by a few administrators with little participation by faculty and students, except for the usual input in requesting budgets. Information on budgetary decisions classified top secret with each unit given information on its own allocation. Participation in long range planning seemingly high however input largely disregarded when decisions are actually made.	VI Moderately Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking Faculty committee assignments are made by the president. Students are appointed by student government and faculty administration committee. Teaching assignments are negotiated between faculty and department chairmen and department chairmen are selected by the president and serve at his pleasure.
RESOURCE ACQUISITION DECISIONS	III Highly Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking Broad based participation in the selection of top administrative personnel with representatives from all units. Faculty and students are appointed and recruited by the dean and president in consultation with department members.	VII Oligarchic, Corporate Decisionmaking The dean and the president are the chief decision makers in selecting a site for a new building. The administrative unit appoints the department chairmen and academic dean jointly.	III Moderately Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking Faculty and students involved in an advisory capacity in selection of a new president. Faculty and students allowed to comment on a select number of candidates already screened by the board.	VII Oligarchic, Corporate Decisionmaking Decisions bearing on the acquisition of unit funds are purely a function of administrative decisions on the allocation of resources and are not unit level decisions.
	IV Highly Democratic, Moderately Federated Decisionmaking Faculty have prominent voice in matters of curriculum degree requirements and admissions standards with routine presidential review. Groups affected by particular decisions are consulted and have significant impact on the final outcome of these decisions.	VIII Moderately Democratic, Corporate Decisionmaking Faculty have high autonomy in the conduct of their affairs except for the constraint that all instruction must be in harmony with teachings of the Mennonite Church. Students are consulted by president and board on the conduct of their affairs.	IV Moderately Democratic, Moderately Corporate Decisionmaking The Faculty (faculty administration body) has responsibility for establishing academic policy subject to direction by the president.	VIII Moderately Democratic, Moderately Corporate Decisionmaking Administration has high autonomy in the conduct of its affairs. Faculty teaching has been subject to close scrutiny by the president.
PRODUCTION DECISIONS				

stitutional change legally requires greater majorities (two-thirds or three-fourths) than most other decisions. Perhaps it is this type of decisionmaking arrangement that distinguishes a democratic "community" from an oligarchic "organization." In the former, all citizens decide on who shall decide, and in the latter a corporate board of directors decides. One must acknowledge that most colleges fall technically into the second category; however, it is the range of differences between colleges that is of interest here, as characterized, for example, by the difference between a Political College and a Conservative College.

Questions about allocation of authority produce some of the most disturbing conflicts in many colleges today. In another political context, Miller (1970) has shown in his comparative studies of community power that the most energetic disputes and widespread involvement of community members are generated by issues involving any change in the distribution of power.

The limited pilot data gathered from the colleges surveyed in this study certainly do not contradict the findings of Miller's studies. Since in a real sense the distribution of authority, as well as the distribution of resources, is a zero-sum game, these decisions are likely to engender hostility among the "losers," as is demonstrated by the intensity of involvement at Political College. (If the faculty is granted the right to decide on an issue, others are deprived of that right, if only to the extent that others will now have to share what was once exclusively theirs.) In fact, the recent increased movement in institutions of higher learning to develop collective bargaining may be viewed as one more indication of the continuing disputes over who shall allocate authority. The establishment of formal mediating machinery can introduce considerably more constitutional clarity, if not legitimacy, into college and university decisionmaking.

#### *Resource Allocation*

It is clear that an institution's allocated resources over the long run are a good indication of that institution's priorities or goals. All of the rhetoric generated by committees on institutional priorities is empty if the budget contradicts these priorities. In light of the importance of decisionmaking in this area, it was surprising to note in the pilot cases the faculty and students' lack of concern regarding these decisions.

It is noteworthy that in two of the four colleges investigated (Brotherhood College and Conservative College) there was a virtual absence of any significant contribution to resource allocation decisionmaking by faculty and students at the broad institutional level. And there was an interesting difference in this area of operation between the other two cases, Political College and Consensus College. Political College had widespread participation of faculty and students along with administrators in resource allocation—almost a mass democracy approach. In contrast, Consensus College, with only one faculty representative to a small budget committee, nevertheless increased the accountability of the budget committee to the faculty by giving this representative the prerogative of taking items to the faculty agenda committee for consideration by the whole faculty. When the faculty representative at a college operating by consensus is accountable and loyal to his constituents, this style of decisionmaking in the complicated area of budget formation would seem preferable to the more highly participatory style of Political College, as it reduces decisionmaking costs while retaining accountability. If one views involvement as an end in itself, however, or if an institutional constituency is so heterogeneous that one representative cannot adequately represent its diverse interests, then the wider participation may be in order.

Given situations in which various groups hold divergent views about institutional goals, low membership involvement in decisions about resource allocations seems to result in negative consequences. These include suspicion by one unit that other units are getting an unduly large slice of the pie (the case at Conservative College; see Appendix); suspicion by faculty and students that the administration is creating its own set of priorities, irrespective of the various priority committees (again Conservative College); and continued dissension because of the lack of open airing of differences. High participation, in contrast, exposes areas of difference and thus makes it possible for them to be resolved; encourages innovation while keeping perspectives realistic, i.e., avoids the excessively large budget requests which are occasionally based on a lack of accurate information about an institution's economic constraints; and increases membership satisfaction (Political College).

The manner in which matters of personnel utilization and unit budgeting was decided was so similar in all the institutions studied that comment on the effects of variations in decisionmaking arrangements is unwarranted. One can say, however, that greater

differences would probably exist for this type of decision if all complex organizations were looked at, rather than only small colleges.

### *Resource Acquisition*

It may be fruitful, both on logical and empirical grounds, for future research to distinguish resource utilization from resource acquisition decisions. Logically, decisions on acquisition, i.e., the allowance to spend (setting budget levels), come prior to any decision to spend that allowance for the acquisition of services or persons. Empirically, there appears to be a significant difference in the way these two sub-types of decisions are made. Resource acquisition of the first order seems to involve fewer participants than acquisition of the second order (resource utilization). For example, the decision to acquire an additional faculty position for a department may involve less participation than the choosing of the particular person to fill the opening. This distinction was not made in the collection of data. Therefore, resource acquisition decisions as used here includes both resource acquisition (deciding to request an allowance to spend) and resource utilization decisions (deciding what or who "to buy" with the allowance).

During the past few years, when it has seemed to be "in vogue" to have broadly based selection committees, faculty and student participation has markedly increased in all of the pilot colleges, especially in the selection of top administrators. It should be recalled, however, that only at Political College is there direct *constitutional* provision for such participation. At all of the other colleges, this participation is extended at the pleasure of the administration and/or board of trustees in office at the time of the selection.

There are, however, norms developing at most of the colleges that should help to keep the selection process broadly based, even without constitutional safeguards, although these norms alone still do not guarantee increased participation in these decisions. For example, at a major midwestern university which has a norm of extensive faculty participation in presidential selections, a new president was recently chosen by the trustees with virtually no faculty participation. It is clear, therefore, that informal norms without constitutional prescriptions may be quite ineffective, just as constitutional prescriptions without informal support also may prove to be ineffective. Here again, the unionization movement may result in a

codification of these informal norms into contract agreements, and a substitution of formal, court-supported sanctions for the usual informal sanctions imposed for violation of academic conventions.\*

Participation in the selection of the top administrator, sometimes viewed by members of colleges as an act symbolic of the common community interest, seems to increase the satisfaction of members. Furthermore, assuming that a reasonable consensus was reached on the selection, commitment to the appointee naturally is higher when participation in his selection was widespread.

### *Production Decisions*

The decisions that exhibit the most widespread participation and also the greatest degree of federation (unit autonomy) are those having to do with production. In an organization reliant upon expertise, it is not surprising that experts have a larger part in the decision-making about matters related to that expertise (production decisions) than they do in other types of decisions. As one can note by reading across the row for production decisions, all the colleges were at least moderately democratic, and most were federated for this type of decision. Galbraith's work (1967) corroborates this fact for industrial organizations.

It is in this decision type that one encounters the greatest negative effects of too much or too little federation of decisionmaking, i.e., a situation in which the producing unit has either "no say" or "complete say" in decisions. For a producing unit to have no say in a decision in which it has expertise is to deprive the unit of the privilege of protecting its interests.

For example, although the curriculum is the mainstay of the educational process in a small college, and affects all members of the community, the faculty has the most information on the nature of the academic courses in the curriculum and therefore is best equipped to prepare a set of offerings. The faculty becomes the decision-making unit. In fact, it becomes difficult for an administrator to usurp this decisionmaking prerogative since it is the faculty that must "deliver the goods." Note the difficulties at Conservative College over the American Heritage course (Appendix).

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\*See Garbarino (1972) and Mortimer (1973) for a discussion of constitutional unions.



However, since curricular decisions affect the entire institution, students and administrators also have an interest in these decisions. An admissions director may know for example, that a curricular decision requiring all students to take a foreign language and a math course will seriously diminish the number of applicants, and he should at least be a consultative member of the faculty committee on curriculum. His viewpoint increases the information upon which the faculty acts and protects other institutional values. A mixture of people from different fields and with different expertise and kinds of information seems an entirely appropriate way to strike a balance between too much federation, in which vital information from other groups is lost, and too little federation, in which the expertise of a group may be used too little. (A more complete discussion of the determinants of the proper degree of federation and participation is presented in the final chapter).

To some extent, all of the colleges studied were federated on unit-level production decisions. Faculty members, in general, had high autonomy in the conduct of their classes and the setting of departmental major requirements. Similarly, administrators made decisions without interference in the operational decisions of their offices. Most directors of development (fund-raising) also had autonomy in the procedures used to secure gifts for their college, although they may have been directed by others to increase the number of gifts (a resource acquisition decision). Hence, some federation of decisionmaking for unit-level production decisions is evidently typical at most colleges.

Students as decisionmakers represented a notable exception, as faculty and administrators most often made final decisions on student conduct. In such matters, faculty and administrators seemed subject to external influences which were stronger than the internal decisionmaking arrangement. There was a remarkable degree of uniformity in student codes of conduct, largely a result of cross-fertilization of ideas of students and administrators from different colleges, as at Conservative College. Not only students, but also administrators and faculty, met real resistance if they attempted to make changes at a rate that was very much out of phase with the pace at which similar colleges were changing. In point of fact, then, decisionmaking arrangements within a college seem to have little effect in determining student rules and regulations, and in the main, decisionmakers make changes only within already established boundaries.



### PARTICIPATION, CENTRICITY, AND VARIANCE GRAPHICALLY REPRESENTED

By plotting the decisionmaking arrangements on two-dimensional graphs one can demonstrate the amount of participation, centrality, and decision-structure variance for each type of decision and college.\*

The placement of each decision type on a particular graph was made in light of the case data. For example, as one may note from the case report on Political College, a large number of participants working in committees and reporting to a central council, were involved in budget-making. This decisionmaking process, which typifies resource allocation at Political College, took place in a single council (corporate) but involved many people (highly democratic). Hence, for this college, decision type II is placed at the "corporate" extreme of the horizontal axis and toward "mass democratic" on the vertical axis. (The reader may check other positioning judgments against the case reports.)

From these graphs in Figure 5, one can "read" the three independent variables—amount of participation, centrality, and decision-structure variance. The amount of participation is higher as the position of the decision on the vertical axis is higher. The degree of federation is higher as the point is plotted more to the right. Decision-structure variance, however, is read in a much more impressionistic manner. Here the attempt is to observe the *spread* of decisions for a given college rather than their *position* on the graph.\*\* By drawing a circle around the cluster of decision types for each college, one is aided in forming an impression of the variances that is sufficient for comparative purposes. It appears that the variances of three of the colleges are roughly equal, i.e., Political, Consensus, and Brotherhood Colleges exhibit a moderately high degree of decision-

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\*It would be possible, when considered desirable, to use this two-dimensional graph as the scale on which to place each decision (rather than each decision type) made within an institution for a given time period. The resulting "scatter" of points would represent the decisionmaking diversity or decision-structure variance for the institution by means of categories less gross than the decision types.

\*\*If the precision of the raw data warranted it, a more precise index of the spread (e.g., an average deviation score) could be constructed by determining the "center of gravity" of the points, measuring the distances of the points from the center, and averaging for a deviation score.




FIGURE 5. Decision Types (I-VIII) Plotted by Amount of Participation and Degree of Centrality for Four Colleges.

structure variance. At Conservative College, one can note the consequences of low decision-structure variance. In the case of a predominance of corporate, oligarchic decisionmaking, the external costs are very high; there are costs imposed by decisionmakers on those excluded from the decisionmaking process.

Although there is no data here on other institutions where low variance is constituted in a different manner, one can anticipate some of the negative effects. For example, if the variance were low and all decisions were made in a mass democratic manner, decision-making costs would be quite high. Since everyone would be deciding everything, an inordinate amount of time would be spent in decision-making. If one assumes that most colleges will attempt to cut decisionmaking and external costs whenever possible, it is not surprising, then, to find a fairly high variance in three of the four colleges.

### ADDITIONS TO THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The pilot data served not only to exemplify the conceptual framework and suggest causal relationships, but also to call attention to several new variables which bear significantly on the original set of variables, conditioning the relationships between several of them.

The original model suggested a set of relationships between the decisionmaking structure (amount of participation, centrality, decision-structure variance, clarity, and legitimacy) and dimensions of organizational effectiveness (goal formation, goal attainment, resource acquisition, and membership satisfaction). The revised conceptual model will include the addition of three new variables: *political culture*, *external threats to the system*, and *membership expectation*. Although the original intent of the project had been to treat decisionmaking as a set of independent variables, the treatment of decisionmaking as dependent upon and affected by these additional factors adds an important dimension to the propositions discussed in the following chapter. Specifically, these new variables are considered here as having antecedent, interacting, and intervening effects on the decisionmaking structure and its effects on dimensions of organizational effectiveness.\*

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\*The specific relationships indicated by these terms can be more clearly understood by the following schematic representations. Z = new variable; X = independent variable; Y = dependent variable. (con't on p 46)

### Political Culture\*\*

This concept refers to the knowledge, beliefs, and norms that pertain to political phenomena—specifically, in this instance, collective decisionmaking. Variations in political culture include a high degree of political *knowledge* or sophistication, as at Political College, or a low degree of political sophistication as at Brotherhood College; *belief* in the desirability of a highly democratic but conflict-ridden system as at Political College, a low-conflict consensual democracy, as at Consensus College, or a relatively oligarchic decisionmaking arrangement, as at Brotherhood College; and *norms* of political cooperation, that is, whether people expect benevolence or fair play from their political leaders and trust them, as at Brotherhood and Consensus Colleges, or operate in terms of political competition in a power game, as at Political College.

An additional aspect of the political culture variable is the character of the extra-institutional political culture in which the college exists. A culture which values egalitarian, democratic political arrangements is certain to affect the political interactions within its major institutions. The pilot data were collected during a period when there were demands from many constituencies for increased participation in institutional decisionmaking. This trend towards participatory management schemes and increased participation found its way into the policy councils of many institutions of higher education, and since the political climate of the United States in the late 1960s was common to all the colleges studied, it should be considered in any attempt to assess the generalizability of the relations between the variables.

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a) Antecedent effects

$$Z \longrightarrow X \longrightarrow Y$$

where variations in Z cause variations in X, the independent variable

b) Intervening effects

$$X \longrightarrow Z \longrightarrow Y$$

where variations in X cause variations in Y through Z

c) Interacting effects



where the causal connection between X and Y is conditioned by Z

\*\*An analogue in the higher education literature to the concept of political culture is the college environment as studied by such researchers as Robert Pace and George Stern. For a discussion of this area see Hodgkinson (1973) and Stern (1972).

Several more connections to the original set of variables were initially suggested by the pilot cases. At Brotherhood College, and to a lesser extent at Consensus College, a participation level lower than that of Political College was found satisfactory because of the faculty and students' expectation of fair treatment from decisionmakers. To put it more generally, under conditions of high political trust, increased participation may not necessarily lead to increased satisfaction. Rather, the increased decisionmaking costs (in time and energy) that result from increased participation may in fact lead to lowered satisfaction, when such participation is considered unnecessary by members under conditions of high trust. That increased participation leads to increased satisfaction under conditions of low trust is suggested at Conservative College. Generally, therefore, political culture and participation seem to be interacting in their effect on membership satisfaction.

Political culture also seems to function as an antecedent variable. It is probable that Consensus College's distinctive consensus decisionmaking arrangement is partly a function of its Quaker culture. Similarly, the particular decisionmaking arrangement that evolved at Brotherhood College is partly due to its Mennonite culture. Certainly the legitimacy level of these decisionmaking structures is greatly influenced by their respective political cultures.

#### *External Threats to the System*

This concept refers to events and circumstances outside the system which reduce the system's survival capabilities. Clear examples in contemporary higher education include the possible loss of revenue, loss of accreditation, or loss of members—all resources essential to an organization's survival.

As the threat to survival increases, those few key members capable of providing the services crucial for survival are given increased decisionmaking prerogatives, a situation usually tolerated by institutional members as long as the arrangement yields desired results. Under conditions of financial strain (a threat to system survival), the power of the president and his fund-raising colleagues increases and is tolerated more (the case at Conservative and Political Colleges) than under low-threat conditions.


This variable, external threats to the system, is seen to operate both as an antecedent variable (it determines the distribution of

decisionmaking prerogatives) and as an interacting variable (it alters the relationship between participation and satisfaction).

### *Membership Expectation*


This concept refers to members' perception of the most probable future state. "Increased expectations" simply means that desirable future states are now considered more probable than they were in the past.

Membership expectation is an important addition to the conceptual framework because it acts upon the system at several points. Most importantly, it affects the level of satisfaction, since satisfaction with a situation depends to a large extent upon what one expects from it. Increased expectations which result from increased participation may act as a *suppressor* on the effect of participation upon satisfaction (seemingly the case at Political College): X = participation; Y = satisfaction; Z = expectations.



The impact of increased participation on satisfaction was reduced by the interference of high expectations.

Conversely, the lowered expectations (Z) which result from a tradition of administrative control may increase satisfaction; people are "pleasantly surprised" by unexpected result (Y), thereby amplifying the effect of participation upon satisfaction:




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\*The positive sign indicates a direct relationship: as X increases, Y increases. The negative sign indicates an inverse relationship: As X increases, Y decreases, or vice versa.

Expectations can also function as an antecedent to the level of participation, serving as the aspect of political culture that links it to participation. The political culture may be such that it engenders expectation of fair treatment by administration, and lower participation would be expected to follow. Expectations may also result from the members' own personal experiences, separate from the political culture, and in this situation expectations serve as an antecedent variable to decisionmaking.

### III.

#### *Summary Propositions*

At this point it is possible to represent the reformulated conceptual framework diagrammatically, with the relationships suggested by the literature and the pilot data (see Figure 6). The arrows indicate probable causal links, with the intersection of two arrows representing an interaction effect. For example, membership expectation interacts with the decisionmaking arrangement (a compound system) in its effect on membership satisfaction.

As one can see from the figure, general causal linkages are noted, but with limited specification of the nature of the causal flow (direct or inverse). This figure is intended merely to provide the main variables which emerge from the literature and the pilot cases and to suggest probable major causal connections. The propositions presented below were formulated to detail direct and inverse relationships, specifying feedback when it occurs. They can be regarded as summarizing statements of this research from which hypotheses can be derived for future testing.

#### ANTECEDENTS TO THE DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURE

##### *External Threats to the System*

**Proposition 1.** *As threats to the system increase, key persons able to meet the threat will gain decisionmaking prerogatives over others.*






FIGURE 6. Suggested Relationships Between Decisionmaking Structure and Organizational Effectiveness (Revised).

If a president, for example, can obtain much-needed financial support for his college, he will gain in decisionmaking prerogatives. Similarly, in circumstances in which a critical talent shortage exists, a talented faculty member or a person capable of attracting talent would likely gain power. This proposition calls attention to the power-dependency theory, which states that as the dependency of B upon A increases, then the power of A over B increases (Emerson, 1962).

**Proposition 2.** *Under conditions of threat, the legitimacy level of a "protecting" oligarch will increase.*

During times of war or national emergency, a powerful executive is more acceptable than in peacetime—a fact much substantiated in recent U.S. history.

#### *Political Culture*

**Proposition 3.** *In an egalitarian "national" culture, participation in organizational decisionmaking will be higher than in a non-egalitarian "national" culture.*

This proposition states the general truth that parts of a system tend to take on qualities of the entire system. It is harder for an industry to be run autocratically in a democratic culture than in an authoritarian one, since members tend to transfer expectations of the national political system into their organizations.

**Proposition 4.** *In a homogeneous organizational culture, participation will be lower than in a heterogeneous one.*

When the participants in a system can assume the decisionmakers are like themselves, then they run a low risk of being adversely affected in the decisionmaking process. In other words, it is less necessary to incur the decisionmaking costs of participation when the probability of external cost is low.

#### *External Agencies*

**Proposition 5a.** *The availability of concurrent regimes (external agencies), to which internal groups in an organization have recourse, will be reflected in the distribution of decisionmaking prerogatives among those internal groups.*

Professional associations, accrediting agencies, collective bargaining groups, or state agencies are clearly used as a threat by some internal groups to increase their decisionmaking prerogatives. The presence of so-called constitutional unions is a case in point (Mortimer, 1973).

**Proposition 5b.** *The presence of external agencies which advocate a "proper" participation level function as a part of the political culture (provide beliefs) and affect the legitimacy of a given participation level.*

**Proposition 5c.** *The presence of external agencies which provide information about the probable effects of decisionmaking arrangements function as a part of the political culture (provide knowledge) and affect the expectations of members.*

These two propositions suggest that external groups, besides serving as power bases, also serve as elements of the larger culture which help to define the "good" and provide information on one's progress toward that good. The AAUP statement on college government (1966) and its recent governance survey by institution (1971) are examples of both functions (providing beliefs and knowledge).

## CENTRICITY AND DECISION-STRUCTURE VARIANCE

To recapitulate briefly:

*Centricity* refers to the number and autonomy of decision-making units (subsystems) in the system. Variations in centricity can range from a highly corporate structure, in which unit autonomy is low, with most decisions made at the institutional level, to a highly federated structure, where subsystem autonomy is high, with many decisions made at the unit level.

*Amount of participation* refers to the proportion of unit members involved in decisions made by that unit. As a variable, it applies to any political unit, whether the unit is the entire organization (as, for example, a university or college), a special interest group within the organization (a faculty or student body), or a still smaller functional group within the organization (an administrative division or academic department). Participation ranges from mass democratic to monarchic.

*Decision-structure variance* refers to the variations in decisionmaking across the institution for various types of decisions. Variations in this variable range from the simple (low variance) sys-

tem in which all decisions are made at the same level (location), and by the same proportion of the membership (for example, the chief executive and his immediate staff or a representative council), to the compound (high variance) system in which decisionmaking prerogatives are distributed throughout institutional levels with different units (and varying proportions of participation within these units) responsible for different decisions.

Given this description of a decisionmaking system, it becomes necessary first to discuss centricity and decision-structure variance and their impact on organizational effectiveness before discussing the effects of participation by itself. Subsequently, while holding centricity and decision-structure variance constant, the amount of participation within each of the various decisionmaking units can then be discussed for a given decision category.

**Proposition 6a.** *As participation increases, decisionmaking costs increase.*

**Proposition 6b.** *As participation increases, external costs decrease.*

It is clear that if decisionmaking activities cost nothing, that is, took no organizational time and energy, then one would allow all persons to participate in all decisions that affected them (i.e., all decisions which would result in external costs). However, since decisionmaking imposes increasing cost as participation increases, one must strike a balance between decisionmaking and external costs. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) diagrammed the two costs functions in the following manner (Fig. 7):




FIGURE 7. Decisionmaking Costs and External Costs as a Function of Amount of Participation.

\*Actually, Buchanan and Tullock use "number of people that must agree for collective action to occur," but the analogue of amount of participation is useful for present purposes.

The intersection represents the balance of costs for a given type of decision. Clearly, the curves could rise or fall more sharply for certain types of decisions, deciding on a budget every year, for example, takes more time than deciding on a constitutional revision once every ten years. Also, the external costs may be higher for institutional resource allocation decisions than for unit-level production decisions.

**Proposition 7.** *As issues become more technically complex, the necessity for decisionmaking by specialists increases.*

This proposition adds an additional element into the Buchanan and Tullock equation by suggesting the need for including, in the decisionmaking, persons with expertise critical to the issue at hand. By so doing, the costs resulting from inept decisions are avoided. For example, a state legislature that sets standards for the construction of bridges without consulting engineers may incur "costs of ineptitude" which could have been avoided by the inclusion of expert engineers in the decisionmaking.

**Proposition 8a.** *If a set of decisions, formally made by a single decisionmaking group, can be apportioned to and made by its members acting independently, the decisionmaking costs decrease.*

For example, if a ten-man interdepartmental committee spent ten days preparing ten departmental curriculum revisions, all members working on all proposals, then 100 man-days would be spent. If, however, the proposals were distributed to the ten men (each representing their respective departments), and each proposal took one day as before, then only ten man-days would be spent. This overly simplified example suggests one advantage in decentralizing or federating certain decisions. A corollary and possible drawback to this strategy follows:

**Proposition 8b.** *Unit-made decisions are more likely to impose external costs on other units than decisions made at higher levels.*

This proposition alerts one to the necessity for making some time allowance for the costs imposed by one department on another (external costs). As in the above case, a sociology department, acting autonomously, may make curricular decisions which exclude non-sociology students from courses required by other departments. Here one confronts the trade-off of coordination needs with needs for economizing time and energy spent in decisionmaking.

**Proposition 9.** *People "close" to activities about which decisions must be made have information about those activities which often is not available to persons at a distance from that activity.*

The preceding propositions yield the following over-all proposition:

**Proposition 10.** *The intersection of the decisionmaking costs function and external costs function,  $p'$  is the need for expertise and information, generate the optimal decisionmaking mix of participation and location for a particular decision type.*

The optimal decisionmaking arrangement for institutional authority allocation decisions in a college, for example, might involve the inclusion of a political scientist and an organizational theorist as consultants (the specialists), plus enough participants to represent diverse interests, but not so many that decisionmaking costs exceed the benefits of avoiding external costs. The decision location might be a broadly representative top administrative council.

Another example would be a unit-level production decision, such as the setting of departmental major requirements. Here the specialists (department members) not only have the needed information and expertise to make such decisions, but also have the greatest interests in the decisions made, standing most to lose by someone other than themselves making the decisions. The organization as a whole incurs relatively low decisionmaking costs. But since the decisions also affect the nature and character of the institution as a whole, the decisionmaking should occur not only within the department, but with joint-action involvement by an institution-wide faculty curriculum committee or academic vice-president representing institutional interests. Students should be included as consultative members to increase the information base for the decisions.

In short, the optimum *location* of the decisionmaking and the *amount of participation* in those decisions will vary by type of decision, since the external costs, decisionmaking costs, expertise, and information needs vary by decision type. For example, authority allocations decisions differ from production decisions on probable external costs, expertise, and information needs even though the decisionmaking costs would be roughly the same. Therefore, a mix of decisionmaking arrangements for the different decision types—a compound system, or high decision-structure variance—is indicated.

The actual intersection of costs will also vary across institutions, as exemplified by Political College and Consensus College. At Political College, where heterogeneity of political interests exists, the

participation is necessarily higher than at Consensus College, where a relatively homogeneous political culture exists (Fig. 8).




FIGURE 8. External Costs by Amount of Participation, Under Conditions of High or Low Cultural Homogeneity.

The following proposition is suggested from the figure:

**Proposition 11.** *The presence of political homogeneity reduces the probability of external costs and consequently reduces the probability of participation.*

One should add here that lowered participation does not *necessarily* follow political homogeneity, since greater homogeneity may lead members to participate more because of a closer identification with the institution. The proposition in any case needs evidence to determine the probability level.

## THE REMAINING VARIABLES

Having defined the most effective overall system as a compound one in which various decisions are made at the level which balances decisionmaking costs, external costs, and expertise, it is now possible to propose relationships that will likely occur within a given decisionmaking area—either an entire organization or any particular unit within an organization.

By focusing on only one level or unit of an organization at a time, one can in effect hold the degree of centrality constant. Ignoring the factor of centrality, and consequently, decision-structure

variance, one is then able to examine relationships among other variables in that system. However, focusing on only one system or subsystem at a time necessitates limiting the analysis to those kinds of decisions that are most commonly made in that system, and ignoring other kinds of decisions that are not frequently made there.\*

This analytic procedure will be followed to explore more comprehensively the pattern of relationships found in this research between amount of participation and all other variables in the study.

#### *Participation and Satisfaction*

In a democratic culture one is tempted to take the simplistic position that increasing participation leads to increased satisfaction, and that therefore organizations (colleges and universities in particular) should make their decisionmaking arrangements as participatory as possible. In point of fact, increased participation may lead to decreased rather than increased satisfaction, either by increasing expectations or increasing decisionmaking costs.

From Figure 9 one can see some of the alternative consequences of increased participation in the form of feedback loops from satisfaction level to participation level.

**Proposition 12a.** *In general, increases in participation lead to increases in expected benefits.*

**Proposition 12b.** *Factors other than increased participation, such as political culture, threat to system survival, and type of decision determine the expected benefit/cost ratio. (These factors interact with participation in affecting satisfaction.)*

**Proposition 12c.** *The relation of expected to realized costs/benefits determines the satisfaction level. (Realizing greater than expected benefits and lower than expected costs generates increased satisfaction.)*

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\*This procedure has relevance for the "decisionmaking approach" used in studies of community power. It is an approach that has been plagued by the difficulty of determining which issues should be studied in a particular community (Barth and Johnson, 1959; Dahl, 1960; Wolfinger, 1968). It is suggested here that for the purpose of studying issues affecting an entire community, and not just one segment of it, the study of resource and authority allocation decisions would seem to be an appropriate choice. The choice of these decision types might also sensitize the researcher to certain "non-issues" that should be investigated, such as, if resource or authority allocation issues do not arise, why don't they? (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963).






FIGURE 9. The Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Satisfaction.

- Proposition 12d.** *The feedback from satisfaction level to participation level will be determined both by the direction of satisfaction change and political culture (democratic vs authoritarian)*
- Proposition 12e.** *If satisfaction is increased and the political culture is authoritarian, then apathy follows, leading to lowered participation.*
- Proposition 12f.** *If satisfaction is increased and the political culture is democratic, then learning follows (through selective perception), leading to increased or constant high participation.*
- Proposition 12g.** *If satisfaction is decreased and the political culture is authoritarian, then learning occurs (through selective perception), leading to decreased participation.*
- Proposition 12h.** *If satisfaction is decreased and the political culture is democratic, then determination occurs, leading to increases in participation. (After a period of dissatisfaction, learning may occur, leading to decreased participation, as in 12g or 12i.)*
- Proposition 12i.** *Following continual dissatisfaction in both the democratic and authoritarian cultures, alternative forms of participation may occur, such as disrupting decisionmaking from within (revolt) or resorting to the use of external organizations (e.g., unions) to gain benefits lost through traditional participation.*
- Proposition 12j.** *The majority of members will emerge as unaffected on the satisfaction scale and will not change their participation level.*

To put these propositions into a concrete context, one can use the example of institutional resource allocation decisions and trace it through the diagram.

Recently, there have been indications of increased participation in the budgetary process (Benacerraf, et al., 1972). Assuming that participants expect greater benefits (larger unit budgets) than costs (time and energy put into participation), and that they realize these benefits, then in a democratic culture satisfaction would increase, leading to sustained or increased high participation. The same increased satisfaction occurring in a military academy (authoritarian culture) may over time lead to reduced participation, since the equilibrium state for authoritarians is low participation. If the outcome of the increased participation in budget-making yields less net benefit than expected, then in a democratic culture increased participation

in the budgetary process is likely to occur for a period of time, followed by alienation and pursuit of other avenues, like collective bargaining. In the authoritarian context, low benefit is expected and people do not bother to participate as much in the future. These experiences with participation are continually mediated by the political culture and continually contribute to that culture.

The group of members unimpressed one way or another by the outcomes of participation will serve as a "damper" on too rapid an increase or decrease in participation. This unaffected group, often a majority of the members, provides some stability to the system.

It should be clear from this discussion that one needs to take into account expectations and political culture (as past learning and present norms) when considering the relationship between participation and satisfaction.

#### *Additional Relationships*

In viewing the relationships between participation and goal formation, one is reminded of the belief often expressed by advocates of human relations theory that increased communication of itself leads to increased consensus on goals. The relationship between participation and consensus is complicated by the initial (Time 1) level of goal consensus before participation is altered (Fig. 10).

**Proposition 13a.** *Given low goal consensus at  $T_1$ , increases in participation lead to decreased goal consensus, whereas,*

**Proposition 13b.** *Given high consensus at  $T_1$ , increases in participation lead to increases in goal consensus at  $T_2$ .*

**Proposition 13c.** *Therefore, there is interaction between amount of participation and consensus at  $T_1$  as they affect consensus at  $T_2$ .*

Through communication, the initial agreement or disagreement on goals becomes exposed and the positions initially held tend to become reinforced.

**Proposition 14.** *Increases in amount of participation lead to increases in decision-structure clarity.*

It should be fairly obvious that the more one participates in a decisionmaking process, the more likely he is to perceive the structure realistically or clearly. However, since there are other vehicles that lead to clarity besides increased participation, such as a written con-




FIGURE 10. Effects Through Time of High Participation on Initial Conditions of High and Low Consensus.

stitution, a presidential position paper, or the like, it is possible, given a constant level of participation, to view the effects of changes in clarity on satisfaction and goal attainment. Hence,

**Proposition 15a.** *Increases in decision-structure clarity lead to increases in goal attainment.*

Given high clarity, less time is spent (and wasted) by members trying to uncover the decisionmaking process, so that more time and energy can then be devoted to achieving institutional (and individual) goals.

**Proposition 15b.** *Increases in decision-structure clarity lead to increases in membership satisfaction.*

The morale problems resulting from misunderstandings about decisionmaking prerogatives are avoided in a "clear" decisionmaking structure.

**Proposition 16.** *High goal formation (consensus) leads to increased goal attainment.*

With no extra expenditure of resources, goals can be attained more readily if agreement exists about goals than if discord exists, since the control or enforcement costs are reduced when consensus exists.

**Proposition 17.** *Legitimacy, goal attainment, and resource acquisition are mutually reinforcing.*

When a system is legitimate, it gains the loyalty of its membership (acquires more resources) and thereby increases goal attainment. The system under which goals are achieved is more likely to be considered legitimate, regardless of its structure, than the system that does not attain its goals.

**Proposition 18.** *Political culture, threats to the system, and external agencies interact with participation in its effect on legitimacy.*

The legitimacy of a given participation level will depend upon the nature of the political culture, the presence of external threats to the system, or the use of external agencies. For example, in an authoritarian culture, as in a military college or a conservative, church-related college, a low participative decisionmaking arrangement will be considered right and proper. Viewed still another way, the legitimacy of certain decisionmaking arrangements can be taken as an indicator of the political culture and not separate from it. In this case, Proposition 18 would read: *The political culture, with or without system threats or external agencies, defines what structure of decisionmaking is legitimate.* The choice of proposition should rest with how useful it is for purposes of research to separate legitimacy from political culture rather than contain it within the political culture.

**Proposition 19.** *Three dimensions of organizational effectiveness: membership satisfaction, resource acquisition, and goal attainment are mutually reinforcing (see Fig. 6).*

**Proposition 19a.** *Increases in satisfaction will increase resource acquisition.*

The resources here are faculty members' and administrators' increased commitment to the college, and the attraction of students, faculty, and administrators to a school with high morale.

**Proposition 19b.** *Increases in resource acquisition will increase satisfaction and goal attainment.*

When there is more money for salaries and more facilities, decision-making becomes less of a zero-sum game, and there are more resources (money, facilities, and the commitment from membership that results from a high level of satisfaction) to apply to the attain-

ment of goals. A sharp rise in expectations might reverse the relationship between resource acquisition and membership satisfaction.

**Proposition 19c.** *Increases in goal attainment increase resource acquisition and satisfaction.*

People like to support a going concern, and this also increases membership satisfaction. (One likes seeing his team win; one likes "ego expansion.")

These interrelationships suggest that although in the short-run, one type of effectiveness must often be traded off for another (it is sometimes necessary, for example, to push for the attainment of a goal even though the tactics used will temporarily reduce membership satisfaction), there are reinforcing relationships that operate in such a way that an increase in one type of effectiveness tends in the long-run to lead to increases in the other dimensions of effectiveness.

## SUMMARY

From these propositions, as well as the literature and data on which they are based, several ideas emerge which may be useful to researchers and policymakers concerned with questions of participation and institutional decisionmaking.

1. It is clear from this research that "participation," in the sense of including more people in existing decisionmaking councils, is a concept which does not adequately reflect the significant variations in decisionmaking arrangements. One must also include some consideration of the *centers* of decisionmaking authority, as well as the distribution of participation within these centers. For the highest council to allocate decisionmaking prerogatives to other councils is different from including more people in the highest council. The research here reported suggests the usefulness of federating the corporate council in some instances and varying the participation in the corporate council in others. This conclusion raises the question of the criteria which should be used in such a determination.

2. The criteria for determining the appropriate participation level is another important notion. By first distinguishing among several types of decisions, one can apply several criteria—external costs, decisionmaking costs, and the costs of ineptitude resulting from the under-use of specialists—to determine the "best" arrange-

ment\* for each of the types of decisions. In varying the decision-making arrangement for each of the decision types, one should try to minimize the costs imposed on those left out of the decisionmaking process, minimize the costs of time and energy absorbed in decision-making, and maximize the use of persons with relevant expertise. The application of these criteria to the different decision types will automatically result in a system of highly varied decisionmaking structures (a compound system).

3. Another idea focuses on the importance of membership expectations and the political culture in predicting the consequences of increasing or decreasing participation. As suggested in the propositions, expectations may in fact reverse the normally predicted outcome of increased participation. Therefore, one must consider the expectations that exist in an institution before a change in decision-making practices is contemplated, and the expectations that are likely to be engendered by a change in decisionmaking practices. No simple relationship exists between participation in decisionmaking and membership satisfaction even in a democratic culture.

4. An additional consideration is the necessity for balancing the multiple dimensions of organizational effectiveness which represent sometimes mutually reinforcing and sometimes competing values. In structuring the decisionmaking for an institution, one should note the probable impact on resource acquisition, goal formation, goal attainment, and membership satisfaction.

5. Another focus is on concurrent regimes, which is a reminder that decisionmaking within an institution is greatly affected by the members' attachment to certain groups outside that organization. It would be impossible to fully understand the internal decisionmaking dynamics of an institution without an appreciation of collective bargaining, professional associations, and state coordinating agencies. In a real sense, these agencies serve as regimes concurrent to the obvious administrative regimes.

These points were not meant to be exhaustive, merely suggestive of possible implications that can be drawn from this research. It is hoped that these ideas, as well as others contained in specific propositions, will be useful for policymakers and researchers in their attempts to understand the relationships between collective decision-making and organizational effectiveness.

## IV.

### *Some Final Remarks*

The purpose of this work has been to provide a useful conceptual framework for viewing the relationship between decision-making and organizational effectiveness, and to propose relationships between these concepts based on previous work in a variety of settings and grounded by a pilot study in four colleges. The conceptual model and set of propositions finally arrived at were developed from relationships inferred from the previous literature and the pilot cases, and embellished by intuition. Ideally, the relationships arrived at are valid and suggestive for further thought and research. The final products of this work—the conceptual framework and propositions—could have several applications:

1. *For research on decisionmaking systems*, by providing a set of concepts and propositions from which testable hypotheses can be derived. These concepts are sufficiently abstract so that the particularities of a great variety of organizations can be expressed in these categories.\*

One might wish to subject the causal model proposed in this

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\*A caution by Blalock (1961) comes to mind: "The dilemma of the scientist is to select models that are at the same time simple enough to permit him to think with the aid of the model, but also sufficiently realistic that the simplifications required do not lead to predictions that are highly inaccurate." Hopefully, the most important variables have been selected for consideration and an acceptable balance maintained between abstraction, which over-simplifies reality, and concrete description, which over-complicates theory.



monograph to tests of several kinds: a quantitative analysis (a path analysis, for example) of a large number of cases, to determine the strengths of the causal flows within the model; an experimental study of one or more of the key variables; other comparative case studies using colleges of different sizes and departments within colleges or totally different organizations to test the generality of the propositions.

2. *For policy analysis*, by sensitizing the policymaker to possible if not probable connections between policy options (such as increasing participation) and outcomes (such as increased satisfaction in some circumstances but not others), and by giving the policymaker a cognitive map for ordering the complexity that he must deal with. For example, by means of the typology of decisions, coupled with level and constituency, the model might serve as a descriptive check-list for initially presenting "things as they are," the prerequisite for reasoned policy change. Further, the delineation of several analytic dimensions—the multiple criteria for decisionmaking costs and expertise, the decision typology, concurrent regimes, and the four dimensions of organizational effectiveness—perhaps provides a firmer base from which to consider such policy questions as: a) whether to opt for the creation of all-campus senates or special interest councils, b) what is the most reasonable way to view and evaluate the collective bargaining movement, and c) how the optimal participation level for collective decisionmaking can be established and its overall effectiveness evaluated.

3. *For broader theoretical model building*, by bearing on the longstanding concern of students of political organization with the problem of social order. It reminds us that *conflict*, as well as *consensus*, is inherent in any association with people, and that it is naive to expect an organization, even the most consensual one, to operate without conflict; that the most one might expect as a minimal prerequisite for order is consensus about the mode of the conflict and the "rules" for resolving it (i.e. constitutional consensus). Further, this research suggests, for those interested in decisionmaking processes, the utility of a political-economic approach to the study of organizations, an approach that concentrates on the acquisition and allocation of resources and power. It is in this approach to the study of decisionmaking that the sociologist, political scientist, economist, and policymaker have much to gain by integrating their perspectives.

## *Appendix: The Pilot Case Data*

In choosing the type of organization to be studied, effort was made to investigate a political system which manifested clear variations on the independent variable—decisionmaking structure—and allowed for relatively unambiguous measurement of the dependent variable—effectiveness. Since one of the chief variables is centrality, it was important to focus on any organization in which both federated and corporate structures were likely to be found. The relatively small college represents such a case in point: faculty, students, and administrators constitute three clearly differentiated interest groups.

The characteristics of the populations from which the cases were drawn were: small liberal arts colleges (between 800 and 1800 students), presently or previously church-related, and located in the midwest. Controls for age of the institution, affiliation, and size of college were used in the sampling. Age of the institution was controlled to reduce the advantage of older institutions in resource acquisition. Affiliation was controlled because the potential resource base would be quite different for state-supported colleges than for privately-supported ones. Size was controlled because of the obvious impact this variable has on almost all social relationships. The data were collected in the Spring of 1971.

The pilot cases were included to ground the conceptual framework and to suggest alterations in that framework. Although the institutional context in which decisionmaking is viewed in this study is limited to colleges with the aforementioned population

characteristics, it is anticipated that individuals concerned with larger or more diverse forms of higher education will find the relationships suggested in the data as generalizable to those other forms.\*

#### **POLITICAL COLLEGE**

*Highly political, highly participatory*

Conflicts about the allocation of authority can result in problems about legitimacy.

High participation in decisions about resource allocation has both advantages and disadvantages.

High participation in overall decisionmaking tends to increase institutional resources.

#### **DECISIONMAKING GROUPS**

The board of trustees has the traditional functions of legal control, responsibility for fiscal soundness and, in general, for the long-term health of the institution. It is composed of 28 members: the college president, 14 members elected by the trustees, seven by the administrative council, and six by the alumni. Three years ago there was a proposal to seat five faculty and five students on the board, but this idea was defeated by the administrative council. The council decided to avoid the risk of raising the decisionmaking center of gravity, feeling that faculty and student membership on the board would be likely to encourage board debates on matters previously decided at a lower level.

As outlined in the institution's charter, the chief legislative body on the campus is the administrative council, which has joint-action responsibility with the board in choosing the president. It advises the president on program, budget, and faculty personnel matters. It is composed of three faculty members elected by the faculty, and two faculty and three students elected at large by the entire community. The president and dean of the faculty are ex officio members. Joint student-faculty-administration committees report to the administrative council. The faculty as a body has authority over changes in educational policies and determines the

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\*For a more complete discussion of relevant methodology see Helsabeck (1971)

composition of the administrative council. The community council is the policymaking body for community living, with the authority delegated to it from the administrative council, and it is composed of nine community members: six students and three nonstudents (faculty, secretaries, clerks, maintenance workers, etc.). The community council also appoints committees to report to it. To complete the picture of decisionmaking groups, one should note the emergence of many ad hoc groups, which form at particular times for particular purposes and then disband.

## DECISIONMAKING BY ISSUE TYPES

### *Authority Allocation Decisions*

As a consequence of a dispute over the president's authority to fire the academic dean, who had been hired jointly by the president and the administrative council, the apparent final decisionmaker on the allocation of authority has become the college attorney, acting for the board.

The unilateral decision by the president not to renew the dean's contract elicited several strong position papers by individual faculty members and the associate dean, as well as a vote of censure of the president by the administrative council, which was approved by 80 percent of the faculty. Debate continued for several months about the larger question of charter guarantees of the council's decisionmaking prerogatives vis-à-vis the president's. When the matter was officially resolved by the college attorney's ruling that the president did indeed have the legal right to make this contract decision, the associate dean and several faculty members resigned in protest, on the grounds that the question at issue was not a legal one, but one to be decided according to the cherished traditions of democratic governance that typified Political College. In short, this procedure was not accepted as legitimate.

What is clear here is that fundamental decisions on the allocation of authority are made by the board (the highest tribunal). This is not to deny the widespread participation in the decisionmaking, however, because it was this extensive participation that forced the issue to the top, and according to some informants, the issue is far from dead.

Unlike system-level decisionmaking in this area, no written

specifications, charter, or constitution allocates decisionmaking prerogatives within college units. The decisionmaking arrangements within units vary from unit to unit, but decisions are generally made by the unit director or chairman, in informal consultation with unit members.

Authority allocation decisions are highly democratic, corporate at the system-level, and moderately democratic, federated at the unit-level.

#### *Resource Allocation Decisions*

There is apparently little long-range budget planning. In fact, Political College represents an almost "ideal type" of incremental decisionmaking. The president resists any attempts to plan too far into the future because such planning might close out options for innovation. The result of this lack of long-range planning is that each member of the community operates in terms of his own view of the desirable long view, with conflict inevitably ensuing. Possibly the president and his close associates have more of an image of the long range than they admit to, but according to a diagnosis made by a member of the academic administration, to admit this would be to open the entire issue to endless and deep conflict.

Because of this position in the acquisition of scarce resources, in this case money, the president gains considerable leverage in debates over educational reform. He is often able to overcome objection to his proposals for innovation by saying, "This innovation will mean appreciable increases in gifts to the college which will mean we can do more of the things we need to do." This argument was used when Political College expanded into a number of regional campuses.

A point of some theoretical interest is the analogous power derived by the chief executive of a nation-state who, in a national emergency, can force decisions to be made because he declares them to be in the interests of the national defense. If one views the financial squeeze of the private college as a case of extreme emergency, the college too can be considered a system under threat to its survival.

In short-range budget planning, this college was distinguished by the degree to which its members participated in the decisionmaking process. The administrative council (which has the authority to raise tuition) determines the amount of money that reasonably can

be counted upon from tuition and non-tuition sources, and appoints eight student-faculty-administration committees to work on the major budget areas. After these committees have worked for several months and submitted a 94 percent budget for its area, the reports are then all considered in an open session of the administrative council, to decide adjustments of requests and allocations of the remaining six percent. Since the decisions being made reflect the college's basic priorities, about which there is considerable disagreement, these meetings are filled with conflict and have been known to last for as long as 15 hours at a time.

There are a number of positive effects on the budget of this dispersed decisionmaking: 1) students and faculty members are unusually aware of what is being done at the college; 2) armed with information of what other units' needs are, faculty, students, or administrators can collaborate on meeting each other's needs, e.g., two departments made aware of each other's situation may each support one-half of a new faculty position and hire a person on a joint appointment; 3) faculty and students join administrators in being "hard-headed realists" concerning what the institution should undertake to do; and 4) the lack of consensus about the college's direction is exposed and, although serious conflict ensues, the possibility of working together toward a consensus is increased (as well, however, as the possibility of increased hostility and alienation of groups by the heightened awareness of the fundamental lack of agreement).

The chief liability of this approach to budgetmaking, besides the possibility of rancorous conflict, is the great expenditure of time necessitated by the process. Unless one views participation in a political community as an end in itself or as a real protection against administrative budgetary tyranny, then decisionmaking costs could far exceed the benefits. However, at Political College both of these views are held, and most persons there justify the time spent in resource allocation decisions as worthwhile.

For administrative council committees, the chairmen are selected by the administrative council and the committee members are appointed by the dean in consultation with the community manager (a student or faculty member hired full-time to function as a "city manager") and the chairman of the committee in question. For community council committees, the appointees are recommended by the community manager and appointed by the community council itself.

Teaching assignments are made by the department chairman and dean acting jointly. Chairmen of departments are appointed on a rotating basis by the dean on the recommendation of the department members.

Unit budgets are handled by the individual units, which can distribute funds freely from categories that had previously been specified to the administrative council by the department chairman. The community council levies its own tax and enjoys complete autonomy in its expenditures.

Resource allocation decisions are highly democratic, corporate at the system-level, and moderately democratic, moderately federated at the unit-level.

#### *Resource Acquisition Decisions (Personnel Decisions)*

Political College gives an unusual amount of legal authority to an internal group (the administrative council) in the appointment of the president. By the board of trustees' action some years ago, the council was given joint-action decisionmaking authority with the board. The board and council try to agree on a candidate. If the board vetoes the candidate, he is dropped. If the council vetoes him, the board may override by a three-fourths vote.

As noted before, the administrative council and the president jointly appoint the dean, but the president may dismiss him while the administrative council may not. Individual faculty members are hired by the dean and the president after extensive consultation with department members and students, and upon the recommendation of the committee on recruitment. As is the case for authority allocation decisions, department chairmen, in consultation with department members determine the number of new personnel positions needed by the unit.

Resource acquisition decisions are moderately democratic, moderately corporate at the system-level and moderately democratic, moderately federated at the unit-level.

#### *Production Decisions*

The faculty, through the curriculum committee, has absolute authority on course offerings. In practice, individual faculty mem-



bers can offer whatever they wish so long as departments continue to offer courses leading to degree certification in approved disciplines. Degree requirements are set by the faculty, and admissions standards are set by the admissions committee (a joint faculty-student committee which meets with the admissions director).

Of the institutions investigated, this one clearly allows its units the greatest autonomy. Faculty members can teach in virtually any fashion they wish, and the students have the prevailing voice in the establishment of community standards of behavior. The administration, however, has the least autonomy of any of the colleges studied, because of the extensive involvement of faculty and students in areas usually left to administrators, and the "watchdogging" by faculty and students of policy-implementation by administrators.

Production decisions are highly democratic, moderately federated at the system-level, and highly democratic, federated at the unit-level.

#### ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

There is no question by administrators, faculty, and students of the legitimacy of the institution's charter, which contains specifications of decisionmaking prerogatives: high constitutional legitimacy exists. However, the manner in which the mandates of the charter are acted upon or interpreted is sometimes considered illegitimate, and these various interpretations are a constant source of debate at Political College: low procedural legitimacy exists. Because of the unique heritage of this college, actions considered legitimate in most colleges are considered illegitimate here.

As has been noted earlier, the institutional investment in decisionmaking is extremely high if one considers the time and energy spent on decisionmaking (decisionmaking costs). However, if one considers participation in decisionmaking to be worthwhile as an end in itself as well as a means to other ends, the usual cost function associated with this highly participatory arrangement can be partially offset by the benefits and contributions to the institution.

There is a feeling among the faculty that a sizable proportion of their number came to Political College and have remained there because of the distinctive decisionmaking structure, within which faculty have great influence. This distinctive decisionmaking structure has contributed, along with other features of the college, to the high *prestige* of the school, which also draws faculty and students.



In general, Political College exhibits moderately high decision-structure variance and a very high decision-structure clarity. Faculty satisfaction with the *performance* under the constitution is low, although satisfaction with the constitution itself is high. Goal formation is weak, as evidenced by the continual discord over the future directions of the institution.

#### CONSENSUS COLLEGE

*Participation fairly high, decisions by consensus*

Shared cultural norms facilitate consensus decisionmaking and generate a high degree of effectiveness.

#### DECISIONMAKING GROUPS

The board of trustees has legal control of the college, but rarely countermands the judgments of the internal community. Three students and two faculty members serve as observers to board meetings. The chief administrative group is the administrative council, composed of top administrators, one faculty representative, and three students. The "Faculty Meeting," composed of all teaching faculty and all administrators with academic responsibilities, acts on most of the faculty-student-administration committee reports. It is chaired by a faculty clerk, elected at-large by the faculty. (This is a notable exception to the then usual practice in small colleges in which the dean of the college or the president presided.) There is a community council composed of three faculty members, three administrators, and six students to consider the non-curricular matters that affect student life. Several faculty-student-administration committees report to this body. "Consensus" is expected to be the decisionmaking approach in all these groups.

#### DECISIONMAKING BY ISSUE TYPES

##### *Authority Allocation Decisions*

At the time this research was conducted, a faculty ad hoc committee on faculty involvement in decisionmaking had just presented a report containing diagnoses of certain decisionmaking prob-

lems and recommendations for solutions. This committee's efforts, the approval of its recommendations by the faculty, and the subsequent enactment of these recommendations represent an unusually high degree of involvement in the allocation of authority, and resulted in increased participation by faculty in other decision areas, such as resource allocation decisions.

A brief consideration of the reasons for the faculty agitation will be useful for the way in which it illuminates the concept of clarity. Prior to this committee report, several controversial decisions had been made: the decision to build a science building over the objection of the faculty; a presidential veto on a popular candidate for director of black studies; the apparent intention of the president to start a program in peace studies without thorough faculty discussion; and an unpopular tenure rejection. These decisions had led the faculty to question the meaning of its involvement in decision-making. The faculty assumed they were being asked to *consent* to something, with the implied right of veto, when in fact it turned out that only its *advice* was being sought. There was generally a good deal of discontent and endless informal discussion within the faculty. This is a good example of how the lack of constitutional clarity leads to lowered satisfaction for some members of an institution.

The committee recommended that issues be classified into categories, thereby clarifying the kind of action required by the faculty—either faculty consensus or only advice. In some instances, issues so categorized might be transmitted to the faculty for their information, and call for neither action nor consideration. The determination into which category an issue fell would rest with the agenda committee, composed of representatives from the administrative council and the budget committee. Any faculty member at a faculty meeting could suggest that an issue be considered in a category other than that designated by the agenda committee. In this manner, there would be a high degree of clarity as to the nature of the decision the faculty was making, e.g., consultative, joint-action, or determinative. During a return visit to the campus, the consequences of this committee report were being discussed, and it was clear that the high degree of faculty involvement in decisions bearing on the allocation of authority had led to results which clarified decisionmaking and improved faculty morale.

Authority allocation decisionmaking within college units varies by the unit; however, decisions are made informally, and generally authority is allocated by consultation between unit directors and members of the unit.

Authority allocation decisions are highly democratic, corporate at the system-level, and moderately democratic, federated at the unit-level.

#### *Resource Allocation Decisions*

Little appears to be done in institutional long-range budgeting, justified by the great uncertainties of long-range income. There has been a vigorous attempt recently to set long-range priorities by means of a committee of three top administrators, three faculty members from the Education Policy Committee, two faculty elected at-large, and two students. This committee is so new that one cannot tell much about its influence. However, it was reported by faculty respondents that as a result of their involvement in this high-level decision area, faculty satisfaction with the institution was much improved. (The Education Policy Committee of the faculty is now working on a ten-year projection of needs.)

At Consensus College the faculty has a representative on the internal administrative budget committee which prepares the annual budget. This committee and the administrative council represent the two key administrative committees on which the faculty sit; students sit only on the administrative council. As discussed earlier, the faculty representative on each of these committees is charged with bringing items to the faculty meeting when the agenda committee decides that it is appropriate. The budget is finally approved by the board.

With respect to changes in the size of departments, the budget committee makes a recommendation to the faculty affairs committee and/or to the educational policy committee, which makes recommendations to the dean, who may report to the faculty before finally sending the report to the board of trustees for approval. This procedure is not followed when the issue is simply one of adding a department member to accommodate increased student enrollment, but rather when a change in educational emphasis is being contemplated, such as the creation of a new program or a new emphasis on an old program, irrespective of student demand.

Until recently, decisions to construct new buildings were made between a few top administrators and the group involved in the principal use of the building. In the recent case involving the construction of a science building, the lack of faculty input concerning

priorities came to a head. The aforementioned committee report on faculty involvement in decisionmaking resulted in a commitment by the administrators to increase faculty and student participation in resource allocation decisions.

Only two committees—the Faculty Affairs Committee (which handles tenure matters and salary scales) and the Nominating Committee (which nominates people for all of the committees)—are elected by ballot. The faculty and top administrators jointly make the other committee appointments. The assignment preferences of individual faculty members are usually followed, although turnover is built into the process to keep fresh ideas flowing into the committees; the possibility of committees becoming fiefdoms is thus decreased. Students follow a similar process, except that the student body governing committee appoints a nominating committee whose nominations are approved by the student governing committee.

Teaching assignments are agreed upon by the department chairman, who usually consults with his colleagues and the dean. The will of the department usually prevails in this, as it does also in the selection of a department chairman, which is made essentially within the department, with the approval of the Faculty Affairs Committee. The chairmanship rotates every three years, with chairmen gaining their authority primarily from their colleagues, not from above.

As far as unit budgets go, once the total amount has been agreed upon by the unit director (department chairman, administrator of a set of services, buildings and grounds, student community council), there is a high degree of autonomy in the spending of these funds.

Resource allocation decisions are democratic, corporate at the system-level, and moderately democratic, moderately federated at the unit-level.

#### *Resource Acquisition Decisions (Personnel Decisions)*

Recently, Consensus College has been in the process of filling the newly created position of provost. In making the selection, a committee composed of two board members, the president, another administrator, a faculty member, and two students was created. This committee, like other committees, operates on the consensus style of decisionmaking, which gives the students an unusual power in this selection process. However, it is important to note here the possibil-

ity that students at this sort of school on such committees may be so intimidated by the thought of objecting to the will of the faculty, administrators, and trustees that they would never exercise veto even if they were so inclined. In fact, it may be that people at Consensus College are subject to strong social pressures not to block action when supported by a strong majority, indicating that the right of veto may be somewhat weaker than one might assume. As one faculty member put it, people meet with a commitment to decide, even if it means a substantial alteration of the original proposal.

The dean suggested that this same selection procedure would be followed in the event of a presidential opening. Individual faculty members are brought in by the department upon approval of the faculty affairs committee and the president. Students are consulted.

Resource acquisition decisions are highly democratic, corporate at the system-level, and moderately democratic, moderately federated at the unit-level.

#### *Production Decisions*

In curricular matters, the will of the faculty is final. Suggestions for change are submitted to the Education Policy Committee, on which three students serve. Here the suggestions either get final approval, or are returned with recommendations for amendments to the faculty meeting, where the decision is finally made.

The degree of involvement and the procedure is essentially the same for decisions on degree requirements and admissions requirements. Faculty members may read student applications, thereby insuring a reasonable correspondence between admissions policy and admissions practice.

Faculty members have autonomy over the conduct of their classes. They may be removed if found to be incompetent, but an instructor's freedom in the classroom is not infringed upon as long as he remains on the faculty.

Students have a great deal to say about the establishment of student conduct standards and are given the opportunity to present their case for a change in rules to the board of trustees directly. However, to say that students' wishes always prevail in this area would be a mistake. Through persuasion, students are led to give up extreme demands. For example, the dean, who is a very "weighty" person, told the student governing committee that he would, as a

matter of conscience, have to resign if coeducational dormitories were officially approved. The board of trustees also may occasionally veto a proposal for change, but this has not happened in recent years, although it might have if the dean had been unsuccessful in influencing the students to abandon their proposal for the co-ed dorms.

Production decisions are highly democratic, moderately federated at the system-level, and highly democratic, moderately federated at the unit-level.

#### **ADDITIONAL COMMENTS**

The prevailing view of faculty, students, and administrators is that their decisionmaking arrangement is fair and reasonable, but the students, in particular, lose patience with what they feel is the slow tempo of change resulting from the extensive discussions. In general, however, the students evidently regard the value of being able to block or alter action which might be to their disadvantage as an even greater value than being able to achieve rapid decisions.

Some of the newer professors expressed dismay over the time spent on consensus decisionmaking, not out of basic disagreement with the principle, but rather because they object to the highly time-consuming nature of some of the issues brought up. There was evidence that the recommendations of the ad hoc committee on decisionmaking were beginning to improve this situation, however. Most of the longer tenured faculty were highly committed to the decisionmaking procedure, despite the full faculty meetings every two weeks, and asserted that the resultant faculty commitment to the decisions made offset the costs in decisionmaking.

The prevailing perception of the dean and several faculty members is that the decisionmaking arrangement is a factor in attracting highly qualified faculty who are committed to the perpetuation of a sense of academic community. Since students are largely unaware of the decisionmaking practices of the college before they enter, it cannot be considered a factor in their decision to enroll.

Some additional observations on the positive effects of this style of decisionmaking are as follows: Rarely is the strongly held objection of a group overruled, thereby lowering the probability of dissatisfaction; there is a strong commitment to a course of action when it is decided on because of the extensive preceding discussion, and greater goal consensus emerges; faculty members become more

committed to the institution and are therefore less likely to take the first best offer that comes along (good resource retention); and communication between groups is encouraged since the approval of all groups is frequently required to achieve the consensus necessary for action.

Some of the negative effects include the time absorbed in decisionmaking, the time absorbed in the socialization of new members of the college into this consensus mentality, and the frustration felt by persons who are strongly committed to the rapid adoption of a program.

In general, Consensus College exhibits high consensus and decision-structure clarity, and moderately high decision-structure variance. The faculty, students, and administrators are highly satisfied, resource acquisition is fairly high; goal formation is excellent; and goal attainment is good.

#### **BROTHERHOOD COLLEGE**

*Low participation, high trust*

**Cultural homogeneity and traditional trust substitute for high participation in generating satisfaction.**

**Legitimacy extremely high and clarity not an issue.**

#### **DECISIONMAKING GROUPS**

The Mennonite Church has chief decisionmaking authority. Unlike most other church-related colleges, which are partially supported by church donations, here the church owns the college and acts through its Mennonite Board of Education. Under this "super board" lies the Board of Overseers, functioning as a board of trustees. "The Faculty" is the chief internal decisionmaking group and includes most administrators. The president presides at the meetings and prepares the agenda, although faculty and administrators are invited to contribute to it. Although students serve on a number of the faculty committees, but not on most of the major educational committees, they have not as yet objected to this exclusion. The College Community Government, a second decisionmaking group, is generally viewed as a kind of student senate and is composed of students, several faculty members, administrators, and staff personnel. The CCG has authority to pass bills which require presiden-



tial approval and also resolutions which are advisory to campus groups.

Recently, the president vetoed a bill passed by the College Community Government requesting approval of coed visitation in the dorms. This bill represented one of the more significant requests made by this group. Of interest was the lack of strong action by students. Students appear very sensitive to the necessity of not antagonizing the churchmen or donors, and accept "anticipated rejection" by these groups as justification for not pushing harder for their interests.

## DECISIONMAKING BY ISSUE TYPES

### *Authority Allocation Decisions*

There is little discussion of authority at this college because of the competing emphasis on brotherhood and equality. At the same time, however, there is a CCG constitutional revision underway, particularly noteworthy in that it calls for few changes in the distribution of decisionmaking prerogatives. It proposes only some changes in representation, a specification of the time limit for presidential veto of a bill, and a call for justification by the president of any of his vetoes. This constitution must have the approval of the Board of Overseers and the Board of Education.

Few decisions bearing on faculty authority are made, but both faculty and administrators expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the present arrangement of decisionmaking.

This situation suggests that low participation in decision-making, *if coupled with high consensus*, leads to high satisfaction, and that the higher the consensus, the less the need for control without impairment to effectiveness.

As is the case for system-level authority allocation decision-making, questions concerning the allocation of authority within units rarely arise. Traditional expectations and norms, giving the department chairman responsibility for the government of the unit, operate for all units.

Authority allocation decisions are oligarchic, corporate at the system-level, and oligarchic, moderately federated at the unit-level.



### *Resource Allocation Decisions*

Decisions related to preparation of the budget are made by a few administrators and the board. The major proportion of the "internal citizenry" (faculty, students, and some administrators) are aware only of the process of submitting their own budgets, but are unaware of the budget-making process in general. A point of interest here is that the faculty and student body express little grievance against this decisionmaking arrangement, trusting the president to "give them a fair deal."

The faculty participates informally in decisions about new buildings. Faculty members suggest any ideas they may have on the subject to the dean or the committee on planning; the faculty's wisdom is sought if the building is being constructed primarily for instructional use.

Most of the faculty members, students, and administrators are unaware of the real priorities that are reflected in the budget, but they are, at the same time, confident that the priorities are in good order. There is so much fundamental consensus about the primary purposes of this college—partly as a function of self-selection by faculty and students—that the feeling is that this area of decision-making can be left to the few at the top without fear of administrative subterfuge through the budget.

Students are placed on faculty administrative committees by the executive of the CCG, and the faculty members are appointed by the president. The will of the individual faculty member is apparently followed within the constraint that faculty members are expected to serve on at least one committee.

The assignment of the faculty members to their classes is worked out within the department. The use of a particular faculty member as departmental chairman is decided upon by the president and dean in consultation with the department. These positions rotate periodically.

The individual units, such as departments and administrative areas, have fairly high autonomy in the expenditure of their funds once these funds have been allocated to them. (Incidentally, unit directors seem to take great pains not to make budget requests which would appear excessive.)

Resource allocation decisions are oligarchic, corporate at the system-level, and highly democratic, moderately federated at the unit-level.

### *Resource Acquisition Decisions (Personnel Decisions)*

At present, a search for a new president is underway, and the process for this selection provides a good indication of the degree and nature of participation in this area of decisionmaking. The search committee is composed of the dean of the faculty as chairman, one Board of Education member, one Board of Overseers member, one faculty member elected at large from the faculty, one student member elected at large from the student body, one alumni member, and the chairman of the president's business and professional men's advisory group. One should note the representation from *all* units on an equal voting par, elected by the units themselves. This is a highly participatory corporate arrangement which satisfies all groups at this college. The recommendations of this committee will go to the boards for final approval, though approval is considered merely a formality. Other top administrators will likely be chosen in a similar manner.

Faculty members are appointed by the president and the dean after consultation with the department members. Given that faculty members at Brotherhood College are expected to serve "extracurricular" purposes, such as "exert a Christian influence on students," it follows that persons other than department members will have a strong interest in the selection of faculty. The same logic holds for the appointment of administrators, and there is also faculty participation in that process. The dean and department chairmen work jointly in the preparation of unit personnel needs, although the president and dean are the chief decisionmakers in finally determining the number of personnel positions the units acquire.

Resource acquisition decisions are highly democratic, corporate at the system-level, and oligarchic corporate at the unit-level.

### *Production Decisions*

In matters of curriculum, degree requirements, admissions requirements, and academic dismissals, the faculty has the prominent voice. The president routinely approves matters coming out of the faculty committees and meetings. It should be remembered that the degree of consensus is high, which mitigates against constitutional confrontations in which real decisionmaking prerogatives would become evident.

On some occasions a higher degree of consensus will be sought than is constitutionally required. For example, an administratively initiated proposal to substitute critiques for grades in upper-division classes was brought to the CCG. The CCG took that matter to the faculty, which passed it by a 70 percent majority. They then took it to the student body for a vote, and the matter failed. What is significant here is the fact that, although the issue could have been decided finally by the faculty, it went to the group whose interests were directly at stake (the students), thereby reducing the negative externalities.

On matters bearing on the conduct of one's class, the faculty member has decisional autonomy, with one major constraint, which is included in the Faculty Handbook under the section on academic freedom: "All instruction must be in harmony with the accepted teachings of the Mennonite Church," and the teachings are listed. This statement is intended to be a selective device, informing any prospective faculty member that if he cannot abide by that constraint he should look elsewhere for employment. The impression one gets from talking with faculty members is that they do not consider this specification a hardship. This regulation gives further evidence of the ideological homogeneity of the college.

The students have consultative involvement in decisions about matters of student conduct, but the president and the boards have the real influence, as was demonstrated by the veto mentioned earlier, of the student bill about coed visitations.

Production decisions are highly democratic, moderately federated at the system-level, and moderately democratic, corporate at the unit-level.

#### ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

The amount of time spent in decisionmaking activities is not considered unduly high by the faculty members and students, who feel it is justified by the ideology of collective effort.

The decisionmaking structure is not distinctive enough to influence the recruitment of faculty or students, but the Mennonite ideology most assuredly is. The strong Mennonite character of the school insures self-selection of recruits, and this in turn helps perpetuate the strong ideological commitment of the college.

In attempting to characterize the decisionmaking arrange-

ment as a whole, one must consider the avenues of communication among the various decisionmaking groups. The president holds periodic forums with students in his office; groups of administrators occasionally hold open discussions with students in their snack bar, students evidently feel free to talk with faculty members regarding almost any topic; the faculty members feel the same freedom to talk with the dean and president, and finally, the board members come to the campus a day or two before their board meeting in order to have time to visit informally with students and faculty members. The result of this extensive communication is the feeling among faculty and students that they have real influence on decisions even though they do not themselves make decisions on some important matters. The decisionmaking is typified by extensive *consultation* between the top decisionmakers and the citizens of the college, although the latter do not have a high degree of formal decisionmaking prerogative.

In general, Brotherhood College exhibits high trust. Satisfaction is quite high. Decision-structure variance is moderately high. The entire process is highly legitimate; goal formation and attainment seem high.

#### **CONSERVATIVE COLLEGE**

*Low participation, low trust*

Oligarchic decisionmaking has a mixed effect.

Control of information is an effective weapon in the struggle for decisionmaking prerogatives.

Clarity of the decisionmaking structure affects members' satisfaction.

Concurrent regimes can produce beneficial results.

To appreciate the present decisionmaking structure at this college and to gain some theoretically interesting data, it is necessary to digress to the institution's practices prior to 1967, before a self-study committee was formed in anticipation of a visit by the North Central Accrediting Association. This period will be referred to as the "pre self-study period." The altered situation after the accrediting team visit will be referred to as "the present."

## THE PRE SELF-STUDY PERIOD

The data on the pre self-study period were obtained primarily through a political scientist informant (recommended by other interviewees as someone who should be interviewed) and the chairman of the sociology department, and therefore must be taken as a somewhat one-sided account.

During the pre self-study period, administrators of the main functional areas had absolute power vis-à-vis the faculty, but operated at the pleasure of the president. Committees of the faculty did operate, but administrators involved with these committees would often convince the committees to alter reports if the president disapproved of what was being proposed. Phrases like, "The president won't like that" seemed sufficient to change committee recommendations or, failing that, the president would have the administrator in charge of that area veto the recommendation.

According to both student and faculty informants, the dean of students during this same period controlled the student senate by trading favors with the fraternities who had controlling votes in the senate and by making "deals" with students in disciplinary trouble in order to convince students to vote his way on issues. Whether these practices took place in fact or were merely widely held beliefs based on gossip, it is nevertheless significant that several informants independently mentioned this practice, which at least suggests a great deal of suspicion during the pre self-study period. Herein lies one of the consequences of oligarchic decisionmaking: satisfaction of the nonparticipants may be lowered.

During this period, the faculty as a whole sometimes did not meet for as long as six weeks, although frequent faculty meetings are the rule at small colleges. Decisions were made by committees under the guidance of the president and his administrative lieutenants, with faculty members often neither notified of committee meetings nor of their membership on committees. Furthermore, the president evidently made important decisions without taking them to the appropriate committee—a demonstration of his control of information to attain the institutional goals as he defined them.

A number of people interviewed felt that faculty and student morale was extremely low. Compared with AAUP baselines, faculty salaries were low, the recruitment of faculty of high quality was reportedly low, and the rejuvenation of the old library had been put off for years while the athletic facilities continued to be developed

extensively. Students were politically apathetic and critical of the unrepresentativeness of their own student association (recall the dean's control). In sum, there was low membership satisfaction and goal attainment (at least of faculty and student goals), although reportedly high resource acquisition through gifts that continued to pour into the institution to support the outstanding football team and the school's conservative ideology. This high acquisition of resources suggests that resources like money, obtainable from a distinctive clientele, may be more dependably served in this kind of decisionmaking structure. However, the acquisition of quality faculty - another important institutional resource - may not be acquired so readily under this same structure. People are attracted by circumstances in which they have power, whether they are gift-giving conservative businessmen or talent-bearing faculty members.

In sum, during the pre self-study period, Conservative College exhibited corporate oligarchic decisionmaking with low legitimacy and low decision-structure clarity. Membership satisfaction and goal attainment for faculty and students were low, but goal attainment for administrators was high. Resource acquisition was also mixed.

The process through which this highly oligarchic decision-making process became transformed into the present more democratic one is an interesting example of astute practical politics in operation, and provides relevant data to theories about the effectiveness of a system of concurrent regimes.

#### **THE SELF-STUDY PERIOD: A CASE FOR CONCURRENT REGIMES**

The reported impetus for the self-study which led to major reforms was an upcoming accreditation visit by the North Central Association team. The date for the visit had been moved up a year in light of faculty resentment over the firing of two faculty members. According to both student and faculty respondents, these two faculty were fired by the president because they were teaching criticism rather than appreciation of the American system in the required American Heritage course.

The president appointed a faculty committee to work with a consultant to prepare a self-study of the college. The chairman of the committee, a political scientist, believing that this might merely be a move to co-opt faculty and students, got agreement from the col-

lege's board of trustees that the right of subpoena be granted the committee if faculty were to serve. This allowed the faculty committee to gain access to information heretofore held by administrative officers, and the faculty chairman did in fact have to invoke this authority when the registrar refused him access to certain information. This acquisition of information equipped the faculty with verification of many previously held suspicions, so that they were "primed" for the accreditation visit.

During the accreditation visit, one member of the accreditation team, a faculty colleague from another institution, guaranteed the faculty members of the self-study committee that there would be an administrative restructuring leading to wider participation by faculty in decisionmaking. This was understood by the faculty members to mean that the penalty for noncompliance with structural changes would be the lifting of accreditation. Further, the team was highly critical of the poor library facility and its non-use by students, and brought pressure to bear for elevating the priority of the new library building.

As a consequence of the NCA visit, a new library was built sooner than it might have been, faculty salaries were raised by 15 percent in each of the two years following the visit, and a constitution was adopted which made explicit the heretofore implied veto power of the president in all matters.

In the discussion of the constitution with board members and administrators, the faculty chairman was reported to have made repeated, somewhat veiled reference to a growing desire by the faculty to form an AAUP chapter (a possibility thought to worry the administration), and gained assurances that "things could be worked out internally."

The above accounts give credence to the notion of concurrent regimes in which power is gained by an internal group (the faculty) by virtue of their recourse to an alternate authority structure (the accrediting association, AAUP chapter, union). These external authority structures apparently operate as a restraint on internal decisionmaking practices even if recourse to them is only threatened and not actually employed.

At this point, the present practices may be profitably viewed as they emerge from the various data sources, which include all the respondents.



## DECISIONMAKING GROUPS

"The Faculty" is made up of instructional faculty, the president, dean of faculties, dean of students, plus other administrators, and is the chief campus internal decisionmaking body. The president presides at these meetings. The three major "umbrella" committees of the faculty on which students have seats are the Academic Affairs, Professional Affairs, and Student Affairs committees. Subcommittees of these parent committees do the main decisionmaking, and students may or may not sit on these. The president has explicit veto on all matters decided by the faculty.

Some interesting discontinuities exist in this arrangement. Students do not sit on the subcommittees on tenure and promotion, but were recently given a vote on the recommendations to the parent committee on professional affairs. They vote "yea" or "nay" on Issue 1, Issue 2, Issue 3, etc., but do not have access to information bearing on the background or nature of these issues. This arrangement engenders some skepticism on the part of students about the significance of their participation.

## DECISIONMAKING BY ISSUE AREAS

### *Authority Allocation Decisions*

Until the self-study, faculty and students were not involved in this area of decisionmaking except informally, among themselves. As an outgrowth of the NCA visit, a constitution was adopted which had been drafted by the faculty, with some student participation. The constitution altered somewhat the previous decisionmaking structure, but primarily only clarified existing practices. In anticipation of the board's response to major reallocations of authority, the faculty included only what they thought the board would approve.\* The faculty admitted that the constitution formally gave the presi-

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\*The lowering of demands from faculty in light of what they perceived as a probable rebuff by institutional power-holders (the board) poses a problem for students of power. Since the power of a group is often measured by determining the extent to which that group's interests prevail in competition with other groups' interests, the tempering of a group's demands (expressed interests), based on the anticipated rebuff of these demands, creates a problem in determining real interests and therefore real power. It is difficult to measure the degree to which power has been exercised in constraining requests for change. See Simon (1967) for a good discussion of this problem.



dent inordinate power, however, under the constitution the president would now have to veto faculty action publicly, whereas in the past he could work informally to squelch unwanted recommendations. This requirement—that vetoes would have to be made public—was felt to be an important constraint on the president's power. Inasmuch as the formal prerogatives of the president were left unchanged, the faculty and students could not be described as having decided to allocate more authority to themselves, but there is no question that they did participate more fully in the decisionmaking of authority allocation.

The increased participation by the faculty in the allocation of authority which took place during the drafting of the constitution seemed to increase the satisfaction of the faculty. The increased decisionmaking clarity resulting from the faculty's involvement in constitution-drafting also led to increased satisfaction directly, and made the faculty more aware of the "rig of the game," so that they could "play" effectively in light of their own interests. Already, in two years, discontentment is beginning to grow over the faculty's lack of authority on budget matters. The formulation of the new constitution made clear the faculty's noninvolvement in resource allocation decisions, and this has now become an issue. This development suggests that, given low participation, increased clarity may lead to lowering the satisfaction of the nonparticipants.

Within college units, authority allocation decisionmaking is left in the hands of the department chairmen. As administrative appointees, their authority is specified by the administration, and although variations across departments exist, the predominant pattern is one of strong department chairmen.

Authority allocation decisions are oligarchic, corporate at the system-level, and oligarchic, corporate at the unit-level.

### *Resource Allocation Decisions*

Decisions in this area are made by a small proportion of administrators, although each unit makes the usual input of submitting its own budget. A few administrators make the decisions, along with the board, about both the size of the pie and the size of the slices. Units can haggle over the wedge allotted them, but they must do this without any information about what any of the other units have been given. Furthermore, several respondents indicated that the

board itself, which is presented with a highly abstracted version of the budget, probably does not really know what the real budget is. Because faculty requests for budget information are continually ignored, the total budget is considered by the faculty to be administratively classified as "top secret."

•One of the distinguishing characteristics of this college is the appearance of participation by faculty and students in major decisions, whereas actually faculty and student inputs are largely disregarded. One case in point is the faculty's participation, several years ago, in long-range planning. Several faculty members participated in a committee to order the present and future needs of the college as well as the required development of resources. The work of the committee resulted in a three-stage development program. After this report had been completed and accepted by the board, the president announced to the college that because of a gift the college would be able to skip to stage three and build the new field house, thereby in effect upsetting the priorities established jointly by the members of the college. The members of the committee were only given an opportunity to react to the possibility of the changed priorities, so that regardless of the desirability of this decision, the result was simply to make faculty and students feel their participation had been "hollow."\*

Since little information about department budgets other than one's own is ever released, decisions bearing on the size of departments are made for each department by the department chairman and academic dean in private negotiations, and it is suspected that the more aggressive, persuasive chairmen get the larger budget slice (although this was a highly conjectural opinion expressed by the chairmen interviewed). The point is, however, that the suspicion stems from the lack of an overall view of the budget by participants in the college.

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\*Some argue that "you can't look a gift horse in the mouth," while others argue that it is the president's responsibility to educate donors about internally established priorities so that they would give accordingly, since a building once built takes current resources to maintain. Perhaps in this specific case the lag time between beginning to cultivate a gift and the actual giving of the gift was too great to allow reasonable refusal following the committee report. In any case, the faculty and students were not made aware of the president's situation and resented this apparent disregard of the administration for the planning committee's recommendations.

An additional indicator of the oligarchic manner of decision-making in this area was the unilateral decision by the president and dean to increase the teaching load from 12 to 15 hours on the grounds that a continuing tight economy was anticipated. The change was intended to avoid the need for cutting faculty salaries (less pay per unit work). At issue was not the wisdom of this economizing strategy, but the fact that the faculty had had no voice in a decision that involved their interests and consequently felt dissatisfied about this decisionmaking arrangement. The students seemed unaware of the entire issue.

Other consequences stemming from this oligarchic corporate decisionmaking included generalized suspicion by the faculty and students regarding the amount of money spent on athletics and other areas considered tangential to the aims of the college. The lack of knowledge of the allocation of resources by members of the college allowed a fundamental disagreement about priorities to remain hidden. One could infer that it is this fundamental lack of agreement that encourages the administration and board to keep the budget secret; it allows them to set priorities effectively without being held accountable to the faculty and students. Depending upon where one sits in an institution, he will view this budgetary secrecy either as necessary for maintaining needed presidential discretion or as a subversion of community intentions.

Both faculty and students have consultative impact early in committee assignment decisions. Faculty serve on these committees by administrative appointment and are then elected by the parent committee to serve on a particular subcommittee. Students have seats on the three umbrella committees of the faculty. One-half of the student contingent is elected by the student senate and the other half is appointed by the faculty/administration body. The general view is that faculty get what they want in committee assignments and students "don't give a damn," a fact not difficult to understand in light of the ambiguous and unproductive results of their involvement in committees, such as the professional affairs committee. It is little wonder that under these circumstances students are politically apathetic.

Teaching assignments are negotiated in a very standard fashion between department chairmen and faculty members and, in the case of disputes, with the dean. The selection of departmental chairman is made from above, i.e., it is an administrative appointment, and department heads serve for an unlimited term.

Resource allocation decisions are oligarchic, corporate at the system-level, and moderated democratic, corporate at the unit-level.

#### *Resource Acquisition Decisions (Personnel Decisions)*

The selection of a new president was announced on the day that the research was being conducted, so that the process by which he had been chosen was still fresh in people's minds. The nature of student involvement in this decision is another example of more apparent than real participation. Four members of the faculty, elected by the faculty, and four administrators appointed by the president had met with the board search committee. After the list of candidates had been narrowed to four, four students (one of whom was the editor of the school paper, an interviewee) were brought in to observe videotapes of the "finalists," and were asked to write down their reactions.

The man finally chosen was a dark horse, not among the four these students had observed, but one who had been met by a different group of students, who had been asked their reactions. Those students were, of course, unable to make any comparative judgment on the candidates, and could only vote a "yea" or "nay" on the one candidate. This procedure left some of the students with a feeling of disillusionment over their participation, and they were subsequently bitter about any assertions by chief administrators that students were highly involved in the selection process. The students were evidently unclear as to their role in this process. It is not that they felt the procedure was illegitimate, but that they had been misled about the extent of their involvement, i.e., constitutional clarity was lacking and satisfaction consequently lowered.

The faculty, on the other hand, although not in total agreement with the final choice of the president, felt that the outlined procedure of selection was reasonable (with the faculty involved in only an advisory capacity) and that the procedure had been fairly followed. One faculty member suggested that the faculty would be more willing to assume that the new president was a man of good will than they might have been had they not had the opportunity to participate at all in the selection process.

Individual faculty members are appointed by the dean in consultation with the department chairman. The president and board have the final voice in these appointments. The determination of the

number of new personnel positions needed by the units is purely a function of administrative decisions on the allocation of resources and is not a unit-level decision.

Resource acquisition decisions are moderately democratic, corporate at the system-level, and oligarchic, corporate at the unit-level.

### *Production Decisions*

As the constitution states, "The Faculty" (faculty/administration body) shall have the "responsibility of establishing academic policies in harmony with the aims and objectives of the college established by the board of trustees."

All these decisions are "subject to the direction of the president." The president is present at faculty meetings, frequently chairs the meetings, and has been known to exert considerable influence with or without the gavel. However, the faculty are aware of the president's attempts at influence within the faculty meeting and are increasingly inclined not to back away from their position but to force a presidential veto. There is a general feeling among faculty that the president would be reluctant to veto the faculty on institutional-level production decisions.

Recently, the president exercised veto over the curriculum with regard to the American Heritage course, which the faculty wanted to drop, thus producing the singular situation of a required course for which there were no willing instructors. Whoever teaches the course from within the institution can be expected to subvert the president's intentions to some extent, and the irony in terms of accomplishing the president's goals is that someone from the local business community may be brought in to teach the course, which is likely to increase the feelings of students and faculty that the course is "just a joke."

Finally, it is clear in this instance that some strong norms of the national faculty community (a concurrent regime), which cut across academic disciplines and institutions in matters of political advocacy in the classroom, academic freedom for professor and student, and unbiased pursuit of truth, are considered violated here, and that the faculty is objecting fundamentally to these normative violations.

It is under such circumstances that oligarchic corporate deci-

sionmaking by administrators about institutional-level production may reduce productivity (goal attainment) by alienating the faculty the group that must produce the service.

Except for the firing of two faculty members over the conduct of the American Heritage course, the evidence is that faculty members have autonomy in the handling of their classes. Students do not participate in decisions bearing on standards for their academic work, but they do have a consultative relationship with the faculty about non-curricular student affairs. Administrators are free to conduct their offices within their domains, i.e., they can set up whatever procedures they deem appropriate to implement policy. In this category of decisions, there is a mixture of prerogatives, with administrators having the most autonomy, followed by the faculty, and then students.

Production decisions are moderately democratic, moderately corporate at the system-level, and moderately democratic, moderately corporate at the unit-level.

#### ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

The feeling among faculty and students is that the decision-making structure is presently legitimate, as compared with the pre self-study period, particularly since it reflects their inputs into the restructuring of decisionmaking prerogatives. The importance of context is worth noting here. The present structure would probably not be considered quite so legitimate without the experience of the pre self-study oligarchic rule; it is primarily in relation to the past that the present looks as acceptable as it does.

To most outsiders, the present decisionmaking structure is evidently not distinctively different enough from the past to have any great effect on the recruitment of faculty. It was suggested that several good candidates may have been discouraged by the conservative ideology projected by the college, but since the candidates were not there to be interviewed, it is conjectural whether these persons were influenced by their inferences about the probable decisionmaking structure of a highly conservative institution or by the anticipation of discomfort about associating with so many known conservatives. This much is certain: During the pre self-study period, several candidates were dissuaded from joining the college by persons already in residence who described the place as "in a mess." During the

present period, the relationship between the reformed decisionmaking structure and the recruitment of faculty is less clear. A fundamental lack of consensus on college goals does seem to exist, as was manifested by disputes over the American Heritage course, and also by the relative high degree of importance given athletics in the budget.

A faculty interviewee made a final observation which bears on the phenomenon of external factors affecting internal processes. He noted that on their vacations, students come into contact with students from more progressive institutions, and that faculty become aware of alternative arrangements of faculty participation through colleagues whom they see at meetings, and also from reading the literature. These external contacts introduce strong pressure for continual reform and continually shifting the reference point for judgments on the internal legitimacy of institutional practices.

In general, Conservative College now—as contrasted with the period prior to the site visit—manifests a semi-legitimate structure with variable clarity—high at times, and low at other times. Decision-structure variance is low. Membership satisfaction is medium, but improved, and goal formation and goal consensus is medium low.



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